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A B S T R A C T. This Article argues that courts can, and often should, implement constitutional
guarantees by crafting doctrines that raise the costs to government decisionmakers of enacting
constitutionally problematic policies. This indirect approach may implement a kind of implicit
balancing of interests, in which the damage to constitutional values is weighed against the
strength of the government's interest in the challenged policy, more effectively than alternative
approaches. When the government has better information than the reviewing court about the
effect of the challenged policy on constitutionally relevant interests, heightened enactment costs
act as a kind of screening device: if the government would still enact a given policy in the face of
substantial additional enactment costs, the probability that the policy serves significant
government interests is likely to be higher. This Article first develops the theoretical argument as
to how (and under what conditions) doctrines that manipulate legislative enactment costs may
be more effective tools for judicial implementation of the Constitution than doctrines that
require direct judicial assessment of the relative strength of the competing interests. The Article
further contends that the federal judiciary already has the capacity to fashion doctrines that
function in this way, and indeed current doctrine influences legislative enactment costs more
than has generally been appreciated.
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INTRODUCTION
In the most famous sentence in all of American constitutional
jurisprudence, Chief Justice Marshall declared, "It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."1 Though
susceptible of multiple readings, Justice Marshall's statement succinctly
captures a particular view of how constitutional judicial review operates.
According to this view, pervasive in much legal scholarship and commentary,
some set of government actions is prohibited by "the law"; it is the duty of the
courts to identify and to police the boundaries of that set; and anything that
falls outside of the judicially defined set of prohibited actions is permissible.'
This Article contends that the focus on direct judicial assessment and
enforcement of constitutional limits obscures important ways in which courts
implement constitutional guarantees indirectly. Specifically, I argue that courts
often can, do, and should craft doctrines that raise the costs to government
decisionmakers of enacting constitutionally problematic policies, rather than
attempting to designate certain government actions, or categories of
government actions, as permissible or impermissible.
3
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (declaring that the
purpose of constitutional rights is "to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts"); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 62 (1936) (stating that a court's task when evaluating a constitutional challenge to a
congressional statute is "to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former"); see
also Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 199o Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination and
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARv. L. REv. 8o,
82, 109-10 (1991) (claiming that "much of the academic constitutional law establishment"
believes in a decisive judicial role in defining and enforcing constitutional rights against
government action); Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1578-79
& n.8 (2001) (discussing the prevalence of this all-or-nothing view of constitutional rights);
Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms ofJudicial Review, iOi MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2781, 2784 (2003)
(observing that traditional debates in U.S. constitutional law and theory are predicated on
the belief that the United States has "strong-form" judicial review, in which the Supreme
Court issues authoritative statements of what the Constitution requires that are absolutely
binding on the other branches).
3. My argument is closely related to Professor Ernest Young's defense of the canon of
constitutional avoidance as a "resistance norm" of constitutional law, which seeks to enforce
constitutional values in a different manner than a more conventional "invalidation norm."
See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000) ("[N]ot all constitutional principles have a
'line in the sand' quality, such that all government acts short of that line are valid and all
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The advantage of this sort of indirect strategy, as compared with a
categorical approach that seeks to classify government actions as lawful or
unlawful, is that it may implement a kind of implicit balancing of interests. In
that balancing, the damage to constitutional values is weighed against the
strength of the government's interest in the challenged policy more effectively
than under a direct judicial balancing test. When the government has better
information than the reviewing court about the effect of the challenged policy
on constitutionally relevant interests, heightened enactment costs act as a kind
government acts falling over that line are invalid. Rather, some constitutional principles take
the form of 'resistance norms'- norms that may be more or less yielding to governmental
action, depending on the strength of the government's interest [or other factors]."); see also
id. at 1594 (developing this point further). My position is also consonant with Professor Dan
Coenen's conclusion that much of constitutional adjudication makes use of
"semisubstantive" or "second-look" decision rules rather than all-or-nothing rules, see
Coenen, supra note 2; Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2002), as well as Professor
Henry Monaghan's classic explication and defense of "constitutional common law," see
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term -Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1975). The argument also builds on my earlier work, primarily in the
administrative law context, on how procedural hurdles or explanatory requirements can
provide costly signals to overseers about the underlying value that agents attach to their
policy proposals. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look"
Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 753 (2006) [hereinafter Stephenson, Costly Signaling];
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural
Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 12o HARV. L. REV. 528
(2006) [hereinafter Stephenson, Strategic Substitution]. Professor Jonathan Masur has
recently suggested how a similar sort of screening mechanism may account for seemingly
ineffective and expensive procedural requirements in the patent context and elsewhere. See
Jonathan S. Masur, Process as Purpose: Administrative Procedure, Costly Screens, and
Examination at the Patent Office (July 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
My argument is also connected to recent developments in the political science
literature on delegation. Much of the delegation literature traditionally analyzed regimes in
which a political principal defines some "discretionary window" in which an agent had
absolute authority. See Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98
AM. POt. Sci. REv. 293 (2004); David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Administrative
Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POE. Sci. 697 (1994); Thomas W.
Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34
AM. J. POL. SO. 531 (199o). More recent work has pointed out, however, that the principal
would often do better by using a "menu law," in which the agent receives variable transfer
payments (or avoids unpleasant sanctions or costs) that depend on the agent's choice. See
Sean Gailmard, Discretion Rather Than Rules: Choice of Instruments To Constrain Bureaucratic
Policy-Making, 17 POL. ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2008); see also David P. Baron, Legislative
Organization with Informational Committees, 44 AM. J. POL. SCL 485 (2000) (discussing a
similar control strategy in the context of congressional committees). This menu law strategy
offers the principal more flexibility in fine-tuning the incentives of the agent, and so it is
generally preferable so long as it is feasible for the principal. See Gailmard, supra.
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of screening device: if the government would still enact a given policy in the
face of substantial additional enactment costs, the probability that the policy
serves significant government interests is likely to be higher.
In a sense, this is a kind of constitutional law analogue to the well-known
concept of "efficient breach" in contract law.4 It would be possible for courts to
fashion contract law doctrines-presumptions, balancing tests, and the like-to
help them determine which contractual provisions ought to be enforceable
under what conditions, and to enforce these determinations through
injunctions. The norm in contract law, however, is to compel the breaching
party to pay damages.' The logic is that the contracting parties usually have
better information than the court about the relative economic values of breach
and performance, so a liability rule is more likely to prevent inefficient
breaches, while allowing efficient breaches. In a similar fashion, constitutional
doctrines that raise the costs associated with problematic government
enactments may help deter policies that are "inefficient" - in the broad sense of
failing a hypothetical ideal constitutional balancing test -while allowing what
might be thought of as "efficient breaches" of constitutional rights.6
This Article has two main objectives. Part I explains, as a theoretical matter,
how, why, and under what conditions judicial doctrines that manipulate
enactment costs may be more effective tools for judicial implementation of the
Constitution than doctrines that require direct judicial assessment of the
relative strength of the competing interests at stake Part II argues that the
federal judiciary already has the capacity to fashion doctrines that function in
this way; indeed, current doctrine affects legislative enactment costs more than
has generally been appreciated. Although manipulation of legislative enactment
4. See John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of Contract, i J. LEGAL STUD.
277 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273 (1970); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model
and a Theory ofEfficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 3, introductory note (1981).
6. While the efficient breach analogy may be a useful heuristic in understanding the incentive
effects of constitutional doctrines that alter government enactment costs, the two situations
are different in several crucial respects. For example, in the contractual setting, the costs
imposed on the breaching party are redistributed to the other party, which implies that the
social costs of imposing the damages remedy are usually small. Typically, judicially-imposed
government enactment costs do not involve a redistribution of wealth from the legislature to
some other party, so the social costs of the enactment cost strategy in constitutional law will
generally be higher.
7. For a general discussion of how judicial doctrines can be understood as mechanisms for
implementing the Constitution, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, iii HARv. L. REv. 54 (1997).
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costs may not be the intended or primary effect of any doctrine in
constitutional law, it is an important function of many such doctrines.
Furthermore, some doctrines might be justified as means of manipulating
legislative enactment costs, even if this was never their intended function.
Understanding both the theory of enactment cost manipulation and the
ways in which existing constitutional doctrines may influence legislative
enactment costs may be useful in evaluating the advantages and disadvantages
of these doctrines, as well as in suggesting alternative doctrinal strategies for
implementing the Constitution. By thinking more systematically about these
issues, one may be able to craft doctrines that more effectively leverage the
advantages associated with an enactment cost strategy while minimizing the
inevitable shortcomings of such an approach.
I. THE THEORY OF ENACTMENT COST MANIPULATION
A. The Inevitability ofBalancing and the Problem of Uncertainty
Constitutional review of government action pervasively, perhaps inevitably,
requires some form of balancing.8 In virtually all hard constitutional cases,
some privileged right, interest, or entitlement comes into conflict with a
normatively attractive competing government interest. 9 The need to balance
constitutional values against competing interests is apparent in the text of some
constitutional clauses, such as the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
"unreasonable" searches and seizures and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' requirement of "due" process. Other clauses, such as the First
Amendment's Speech and Religion Clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, appear to embody more absolute prohibitions. But in
practice, when defining the underlying right that is protected "absolutely" and
in specifying the remedies available, courts have recognized the need to balance
competing values and interests.1"
8. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343
(1993); Fallon, supra note 7; Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation,
196o SuP. CT. REv. 75, 78-8o. But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
9. See Fallon, supra note 8; Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Government Interests: An Essential
but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988); Symposium,
Conference on Compelling Government Interests: The Mystery of Constitutional Analysis, 55 ALB.
L. REV. 535 (1992).
1o. See David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian
Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1547-63 (1992); Fallon, supra
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This is not to assert that all constitutional doctrines involve some form of
case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances balancing, nor that they should. As
an empirical matter, pure balancing tests are relatively rare (though certainly
not absent) in constitutional law.1' As a normative matter, scholars of various
ideological stripes have argued against the wisdom of doctrines that call for
judges to engage in all-things-considered, case-specific balancing. 2 Yet in
those areas in which courts reject case-by-case "retail" balancing of
constitutional values and competing interests, they typically engage in a kind of
"wholesale" balancing when formulating or refining their doctrinal
approaches.13 For example, a judicial decision that a category of government
action is presumptively lawful or unlawful, or that certain types of controversy
are nonjusticiable, implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) rests on a judgment
about how to strike the appropriate balance between some constitutionally
protected value and the government's interest in advancing legitimate public
policy objectives. 4 Similarly, when courts decide that certain categories of
government action will be subject to relatively forgiving "rational basis"
review, while other categories will have to meet a more demanding level of
scrutiny, these classification decisions typically involve probabilistic judgments
about the likely costs and benefits of actions within the specified categories."
Thus, rejection of retail balancing in individual cases generally implies
wholesale balancing in the creation of doctrinal tests to implement
constitutional guarantees.
To assert that constitutional adjudication and doctrinal formulation require
balancing constitutional values against legitimate competing interests is to
frame the problem faced by the courts, not to resolve it. How are courts to
strike the appropriate balance? How are they to devise doctrinal frameworks
that maximize the chances that an appropriate balance will be struck? This
problem is especially acute given that courts face two well-known institutional
note 8, at 361-64; Karst, supra note 8, at 78-80; Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 857 (1999).
11. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 76.
12. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs 135-66 (1991) (arguing in favor of rule-
based decisionmaking on fairness, reliance, and efficiency grounds); Aleinikoff, supra note 8,
at 972-95; Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community, and the Judicial Balance: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 56-6o (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against
Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1697, 1700-02 (1988); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
13. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 361-65; Fallon, supra note 7, at 77-78.
14. See Faigman, supra note lo, at 1547-63; Fallon, supra note 8, at 361-64; Richard H. Fallon,
Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1274 (2oo6).
iS. See Fallon, supra note 7.
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limitations. First, the federal judiciary's lack of direct electoral accountability
raises questions about the extent to which courts may make value-laden
judgments about the validity and relative importance of alleged constitutional
rights and competing government interests. Alexander Bickel famously dubbed
this legitimacy problem the "countermajoritarian difficulty," 6  and
constitutional theorists have debated it ad nauseum for a half-century since.
17
Even if one brackets or rejects the legitimacy objection to judicial review,
courts still face a second institutional problem: their comparative disadvantage
in gathering and evaluating information about the connection between policies
and outcomes. It is not enough to assign normative weight to constitutionally
protected values and competing government interests in the abstract. One
must also assess the likely consequences of the challenged government action
for those values and interests . Yet judges may not be especially good at
making these sorts of empirical or predictive judgments, and that creates
problems independent of the normative legitimacy of countermajoritarian
judicial review. 9
To illustrate the distinction between the legitimacy problem and the
information problem, consider a stylized example. Imagine that a speaker in a
public park is delivering a racist rant to a large crowd, and the police detain
him pursuant to a statute that proscribes speech that is likely to incite racial
violence. Now suppose (unrealistically) that the court reviewing the case could
be certain that the probability that this speech (or this type of speech) would
actually cause a race riot is fifteen percent. The example thus assumes away the
court's information problem. The legitimacy problem remains, however. If the
16. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962).
17. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002); Barry Friedman, The
Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L.
REv. 933 (2001).
18. See Karst, supra note 8, at 81, 84.
ig. See Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. Rav.
199, 209 (1971); Neal Devins, Congressional Facfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, So DUKE L.J. 1169, 1178-82 (2OO1); Fallon, supra note 8, at 376. This
information problem may arise because the professional background and training of judges,
coupled with the comparative institutional insulation of the judiciary, makes courts
systematically worse than a legislature or executive at assimilating empirical data and
making factual predictions. The lack of electoral accountability may also mean the courts are
more likely to err in assessing the impact of various statutory proposals on the welfare of
relevant constituencies. But see Devins, supra, at 1182-86 (suggesting that, even if Congress
has a superior institutional capacity to make predictive empirical judgments, it may lack
appropriate institutional incentives to gather and use factual information appropriately).
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court were to hold that the statute is unconstitutional, one might reasonably
ask why an unelected court is entitled to decide that a fifteen percent chance of
a race riot is not high enough to prohibit inflammatory speech when the
democratically elected legislature reached a different conclusion. Responding
to this challenge is especially difficult if we concede that there is some point at
which the risk of violence is so great that prohibiting the speech would be
justified. (Imagine, again unrealistically, that the court knew with absolute
certainty that this speech, if allowed, would trigger a city-wide race riot in
which hundreds would die.) If we make that concession, then we have
admitted the need for some sort of balancing. Yet how confident can we be that
the court will strike the balance at the right point? Should a fifteen percent risk
of a riot be sufficient to restrain speech? Five percent? Thirty percent? There
are good reasons to worry about whether courts will assign the correct
normative weight to the competing interests.
Now, consider a variant on the same example in which the legitimacy
problem is assumed away but the information problem is present. Suppose
that the court both would and should find the hypothetical statute
unconstitutional as applied if, but only if, the probability that the targeted
speech would incite a riot is less than twenty percent. That is, the government
interest in public safety outweighs the speaker's autonomy and self-expression
interests only if the probability of inciting a riot is greater than twenty percent.
Even if there is no normative legitimacy problem with allowing the court to
enforce that principle, the court is likely to be quite uncertain as to the true
probability that the speech in question might cause a riot. Furthermore, even
though the government, the defendant, and other interested parties might have
better information on this point, they have an incentive to exaggerate in
whichever direction favors their interests: the defendant's attorney will insist
that the probability of this speech inciting violence was very low, while the
government will insist that it was very high. The court will need to come up
with some way to sift through the competing arguments and evidence and
make the judgment that minimizes the aggregate error costs.
This simple pair of examples illustrates the conceptual distinction between
concerns about courts' ability to correctly assign normative weight to
constitutional values and competing government interests, and limitations on
courts' capacity to evaluate the degree to which those values and interests are
implicated by a given government action. In real life, the distinction is more
elusive, and the degree to which a judicial decision or doctrine reflects a court's
normative judgment about the relative importance of different interests, rather
than an empirical prediction about the probable effect of the challenged policy
118:2 2008
THE PRICE OF PUBLIC ACTION
on the relevant values, may not always be clear.2° Nonetheless, there is an
important conceptual distinction between the objection that courts are
unqualified to make value determinations (the legitimacy problem) and the
objection that they are unqualified to assess (or predict) relevant facts (the
information problem).
That distinction is important for purposes of this Article because the focus
here is primarily on doctrinal solutions to the judiciary's information problem.
As in the second version of the hypothetical hate speech case, the Article
assumes away concerns about whether the courts assign the appropriate level
of normative significance to various rights, values, and interests. This is not
because these concerns are unimportant, nor because the judiciary's ability to
make contested normative value judgments is unproblematic. But this Article's
central arguments principally concern the doctrinal strategies that courts can
employ to ameliorate their informational limitations. In exploring that issue,
bracketing the legitimacy objection simplifies the analysis and exposition.
B. Enactment Costs and the Implementation of the Constitution
This Article's central claim is that judicial doctrines can raise the costs to
legislators2 of enacting a given policy, thereby increasing the probability that
policies subsequently enacted would satisfy a hypothetical ideal balancing test
of constitutional values against competing government interests. The
argument is not simply that judicial doctrines can reduce the total quantity of
constitutionally problematic legislation by imposing an implicit tax on such
legislation, though that is certainly one effect of doctrines that raise legislative
enactment costs. Rather, I advance the stronger claim that judicial imposition
of additional enactment costs on legislatures enables courts to reduce their
comparative informational disadvantage. The better-informed government
decisionmakers will only be willing to act when their true interest in the policy
is sufficiently strong; government exaggeration of its true interest becomes a
less viable strategy. Thus, courts may be able to approximate indirectly the
outcomes that would be achieved by an ideal (but practically
unimplementable) constitutional balancing test.
20. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 544, 546 (1991) (claiming
that the "Court fails to distinguish between normative principles and empirical
propositions" and noting the Court's traditional "casual interweaving of fact and law").
21. The same analysis applies to other government decisionmakers, including the President, law
enforcement officials, and administrative agencies. The textual focus on legislative
decisionmaking is purely for expositional convenience.
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The idea can be illustrated with another stylized example. Imagine that
Congress is considering a statute that would advance some legitimate
government interest but that would also injure some constitutional value. For
concreteness, imagine a statute that would impose new regulatory obligations
on Internet service providers. Proponents of the legislation justify it in terms of
some legitimate public interest, such as eliminating online copyright
infringement or protecting national security by blocking or monitoring the
transmission of classified government information. The statute, however, may
also threaten values protected by the Constitution, such as speech rights or
privacy rights.
Securing passage of the statute requires effort on the part of supportive
legislators and interest groups. This is true even for legislative proposals that
are relatively simple and uncontroversial, and it is especially true for more
complex or divisive proposals. The costs to legislators and interest groups of
drafting and enacting legislation, other than the disadvantages of the
legislation itself, are primarily opportunity costs. Legislators have limited time,
staff, and political capital to allocate to a variety of activities, including not only
legislation but also oversight, constituency service, campaigning, and public
relations activities. A rational legislator will allocate her limited resources
among these activities so as to maximize her ability to achieve her objectives,
which will typically include reelection or career advancement, ideological or
policy goals, prestige, and leisure.22 Therefore, when a legislator considers
whether to work toward the enactment of a given bill, such as the hypothetical
Internet regulation statute, she will consider not only how passage of that
statute would benefit her, but also the opportunity costs of devoting resources
to that bill rather than to other activities. Interest groups typically face a similar
kind of tradeoff: effort devoted to securing the passage of any one legislative
proposal is effort that cannot be devoted to some other valued activity.
Legislation will be enacted only if a sufficient number of influential players
believe that the net political and policy benefits associated with the legislation
outweigh the opportunity costs of devoting sufficient effort to ensure passage.
Suppose that the benefits to legislators and interest groups of passing the
hypothetical Internet regulation statute exceed the costs, so that the statute is
enacted into law. The statute might then be challenged on constitutional
grounds. If a court composed of omniscient judges were able to apply an ideal
constitutional balancing test, it would uphold the statute if and only if the
legitimate government interests in enacting the statute (such as fostering
22. See, e.g., BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL 21-23 (2003);
RICHARD F. FENNO, IR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 137 (1978).
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innovation or defending against threats to national security) outweigh the
injury to constitutionally significant values (such as speech and privacy).23
Alternatively, if the court were confident that the legislature would always fully
internalize the costs and benefits of its decisions, then judicial review would be
superfluous, because the court, even if not omniscient, would always uphold
the decisions of the wise and benevolent legislature.
Problems arise, however, if the judiciary has incomplete information and
the legislature has misaligned incentives 4 The legislature may undervalue the
constitutional interests at stake - or, equivalently, it may overvalue the
competing benefits. In other words, the private benefit of enacting the statute
may exceed the private enactment cost for a sufficient number of legislators
and interest groups, even though the social benefit of the statute is less than its
social cost. When this is the case, the legislature may favor statutes that would
fail the hypothetical ideal balancing test. If the reviewing court were
omniscient, or at least had information as good as the legislature's about the
statute's likely effects, the court could still constrain the legislature through the
application of the ideal constitutional balancing test. But if the court's
information about the issues at stake is not as good as the legislature's, the
court's problem is much more difficult.
To illustrate, assume that the court can confidently assess the degree to
which the hypothetical Internet regulation statute impinges on constitutionally
privileged speech and privacy rights, but the court's information about the
statute's relationship to competing government interests -intellectual property
protection, national security, or what have you - is significantly worse than the
legislature's. To make the information problem as stark as possible, albeit at
the price of some descriptive realism, assume that the legislature (considered as
a unitary actor") knows the public benefit of the statute with certainty even
23. The judge could do even better if she could credibly commit in advance to uphold only
statutes for which the public benefits exceed the sum of the constitutional costs and the
social opportunity costs of enactment. Credible commitment would be necessary because, at
the moment the statute comes before the court, enactment costs are sunk.
24. Yet more problems arise if the judiciary has misaligned incentives and the legislature's
information is no better than the court's. Serious as those problems are, I put them aside for
purposes of developing this Article's central theoretical argument.
25. The theoretical difficulties with treating a multi-member body as a unitary decisionmaker
are well known. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDMDUAL VALUES (1951);
Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications
for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They,"
Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). This Article,
however, neither assumes a single legislative intent or will, nor relies on the assumption that
all members of the legislature have the same information. Rather, this Article assumes that
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though it may undervalue the constitutional interests at stake, while the
reviewing court, despite having exactly the right values, can only make a rough
estimate of the statute's impact on legitimate public interests.
If the reviewing court had to rely only on its own information, it would
have to decide whether the expected public benefit of the statute -given the
court's incomplete information-is greater or less than the cost to
constitutional values. 6 The court could apply a kind of retail balancing test or,
alternatively, some other doctrinal formula that the court believes will achieve
an appropriate constitutional balance at the wholesale level. But these
approaches entail substantial error costs. The court's uninformed application of
the relevant test may prevent the enactment of socially desirable,
constitutionally justifiable legislation. After all, the true social benefit of the
statute may be much larger than the court's estimate of the expected benefit.
On the other hand, the court may end up approving a statute that inflicts an
unjustifiably large injury to constitutionally protected values, if it turns out that
the actual benefit of the statute is much lower than the expected benefit.
This dilemma is a well-known problem with judicial attempts to balance
constitutional and other public values, whether at the retail level or the
wholesale level. The question therefore arises whether there are better ways
that the court can implement constitutional values, instead of a direct but
uninformed inquiry into the effect of a challenged statute on constitutionally
relevant values and interests. Is it possible for the court to establish doctrinal
mechanisms that induce outcomes that more closely approximate those of a
hypothetical ideal constitutional balancing test?
There are a number of ways that the courts might attempt to achieve such a
result. One strategy targets the problem of misaligned legislative incentives,
developing doctrines designed to induce greater legislative deliberation or to
limit the influence of parochial interest groups. 7 Another approach is to
the legislature employs some set of institutional arrangements that generate stable
equilibrium policy choices, see, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and
Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. ScI. 27 (1979), and that the
equilibrium policy choice is affected by information that members of the legislature receive
and process concerning the impact of various policies on some normatively relevant set of
outcomes. Characterizing the legislature, or the enacting coalition, as a unitary actor that
"knows" the effect of policies on outcomes and chooses the policy that would advance "its"
interest is a shorthand way of describing this more complex collective choice process.
26. Again, if the court could commit to a decision rule ahead of time, it would uphold the
statute only if the expected public benefit exceeded the sum of the constitutional costs and
the social opportunity costs of enactment.
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985)
(arguing that many constitutional doctrines can be understood as checking the power of
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establish doctrinal tests that elicit more accurate and credible information from
the legislature about the public interests at stake, for example by demanding
certain types of evidentiary showings or information disclosure.28 An
alternative or complementary strategy, and the one on which this Article
focuses, is to formulate doctrines that establish indirect mechanisms that
credibly transfer information from the legislature to the court. One such
approach is to increase the costs to the legislature of enacting constitutionally
problematic legislation.
To see how this strategy could work, consider a case in which the
legislature, though better informed than the court, systematically undervalues
constitutionally privileged interests, or overvalues competing government
objectives. Under this assumption, the private cost to legislators of enacting a
given statute -the opportunity costs of enactment, plus the other perceived
disadvantages of the law-may be smaller than the statute's social costs,
including its impact on constitutional values. If, however, the opportunity cost
of enacting the statute were to increase to the point at which the statute's
private cost to a decisive legislative coalition were equal to the true social cost,
then the legislature would never enact a statute with negative net social value.
The legislature, however, would still pass the legislation if the private benefit to
a decisive coalition were sufficiently high. Enactment costs thus function as a
screening device, deterring legislative action with low private benefit to the
legislature.
Because all legislative activity entails opportunity costs, some screening will
take place even without judicial intervention. Furthermore, the legislative
process laid down in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution-which requires
the assent of both houses of Congress plus the President, or two-thirds of each
house if the President is in opposition -might itself be considered a device for
raising the enactment costs of legislation, thereby helping to ensure that any
legislation that makes it through this process is perceived by a sufficiently large
number of legislators and interest groups not just as having some positive
parochial interests by inducing greater deliberation by legislatures); Cass R. Sunstein,
Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) (arguing that much
constitutional doctrine can be understood as a means to prohibit legislative action intended
to benefit particular interest groups rather than to serve the public interest).
a8. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory
Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1137 (2001) (applying a model in which cost-benefit analysis
entails disclosure of information about policy effects by a better-informed agent to a less-
informed political principal); Matthew C. Stephenson, Evidentiary Standards and Information
Acquisition in Public Law, AM. L. & ECON. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (considering how
judicial demands for certain types of evidentiary showings affect government
decisionmakers' incentives to acquire information).
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value, but as having substantial positive value.29 If the existing screen is not
sufficiently powerful to filter out enough undesirable statutes, though, the
courts can try to find ways to make the screen more demanding. One way for
the courts to do this is by developing doctrines that raise enactment costs for
those statutes for which the legislature is likely to overvalue the statute's
benefits relative to its costs. The court's manipulation of legislative enactment
costs enables it to extract more information from the legislature about the true
public benefit of the statute in question. Even if the court cannot verify the
government's assertions regarding the legislation's benefits, the magnitude of
the enactment cost forces the government to credibly reveal some of its private
information indirectly through its behavior. Judicial doctrines that raise the
government's enactment cost thus increase the credibility of the government's
assertion that it has a sufficiently strong interest in the legislation to justify the
injury to constitutionally privileged values.
C. The Theory's Domain
In order for judicial doctrine to perform the hypothesized screening
function described in the preceding section, four critical assumptions must
hold. First, the relevant government policymakers' private interest in enacting
a policy must be positively correlated (in expectation) with some normatively
legitimate social interest, even though the government's interest in enacting the
policy is systematically too strong. Second, the enacting legislative coalition
must have better information about the expected impact of the policy than does
the reviewing court, but the court must have reasonably good information
about the enacting coalition's policy preferences. Third, the court must be able
to fashion doctrines that increase the private opportunity cost of enactment for
the decisive legislative coalition by more than these doctrines increase the social
opportunity cost of enactment. Fourth, judicial doctrine must be capable of
imposing enactment costs that are large enough to decrease the government's
willingness to pursue the targeted class of policy decisions.
This Article does not claim that all of these assumptions always hold.
Rather, the claim - more modest, but perhaps still controversial - is that they
29. This beneficial effect of the Constitution's cumbersome lawmaking procedure (as well as
other "supermajority" rules) has been advanced and defended in a series of articles by John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority
and Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1128-37 (2007); John
0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 8o TEx. L. REV.
703, 734-43 (2002); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a
Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 407-18 (1999)-
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hold sufficiently often that a functionalist theory of judicial doctrine that
focuses on manipulation of enactment costs is important to understanding and
assessing the operation of real-world constitutional review. In order to better
understand both the theory and the limits to its domain, I will elaborate on
each of these four key assumptions.
i. Preferences
The first critical assumption is that the government's interest in a given
policy is likely to be positively correlated with the true social interest in that
policy, but also likely to be too strong. This assumption will hold when the
government systematically undervalues constitutionally privileged interests, but
not when the government is excessively hostile to those interests.
The critical distinction between undervaluation and hostility can be
illustrated in the context of the Equal Protection Clause's restriction of race-
based discrimination. Bracket for the moment debates about the legitimacy of
distilling purposes or values from constitutional texts, as well as controversies
about the scope and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. Let us assume, for
the sake of developing the distinction between undervaluation and hostility,
that the central purposes of the Equal Protection Clause include the elimination
of economic, political, and social subjugation of non-white minorities, as well
as race-based stereotyping and stigmatization.3" If these are the values the
Equal Protection Clause is meant to advance, it is reasonable to suppose that
the Southern legislatures that enacted Jim Crow legislation were hostile to
these values. The very purpose of Jim Crow, after all, was to perpetuate the
subordination and stigmatization of African Americans. The more effectively
segregationist legislation achieved these goals -that is, the more effectively it
subverted the values embodied by the Equal Protection Clause -the greater its
appeal to a pro-Jim Crow legislature.
But not all government action that offends the Equal Protection Clause
does so because the enacting officials are hostile to the Clause's values.
Consider the California prison officials who decided to segregate prisoners on
30. Many scholars have argued that this, or something like it, is the most plausible
understanding of the purposes of the Clause. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514-21 (2d ed. 1988); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, S PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92
MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2429 (1994). This, of course, is a controversial position, but given that
the example in the text is merely illustrative, it is not necessary for this Article to take a
position on whether it is correct.
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the basis of race for their first sixty days in the state penal system.31 These
officials asserted that their goal was to reduce the risk of race-based prison
violence,3" and there is little reason to doubt their honesty. Indeed, it seems
implausible that these officials hoped by their actions to perpetuate the
subordination of non-white minorities or the propagation of negative
stereotypes about race.33 It is much more likely either that these officials gaveno thought to how a presumption in favor of racial segregation would affect
the dignity of non-white prisoners or the public perception of race as a
predictor of behavior, or else that these officials believed such negative
consequences would be outweighed by the benefits of reducing prison violence.
That does not make the prison segregation policy desirable or
constitutional. It is quite possible that the prison officials, confronted as they
were with the immediate and serious risks of violence, undervalued the
constitutional interests safeguarded by the Equal Protection Clause.
Insensitivity to these interests may well have led the state to enact an
unjustifiable policy. But the problem in this case is undervaluation of the
constitutional interest, not hostility to it. Evidence showing that the prison
segregation policy would degrade the dignity of African-American prisoners
more than had been previously supposed would almost certainly have made
this policy less appealing, not more appealing, to the responsible officials.
The distinction between undervaluation and hostility is important, not
least because it highlights the fact that not all, or even most, government
threats to constitutional rights spring from hostility to constitutional values.34
The distinction is particularly important for the theory developed in this
Article, because a judicial strategy that relies on increasing legislative enactment
costs will be much more effective when the legislature undervalues
constitutional interests than when it is hostile to them. In the former case,
forcing the legislature to show that it is deeply committed to a policy is more
likely to result in the enactment only of those decisions in which the
constitutional values at stake really are outweighed by legitimate competing
interests. In the latter case, intense legislative commitment to a particular
31. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
32. See id. at 502-03.
33. But see id. at 519 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding a "very real risk that prejudice (whether
conscious or not) partly underlies the [state officials'] policy").
34. The injury to those values is not necessarily less severe when the cause is undervaluation
rather than hostility, though there is an ongoing debate about the normative significance of
"government purpose," on which this Article takes no position. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-79 (1980); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54
UCLAL. REv. 1267 (2007).
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policy may actually indicate that the injury to constitutionally privileged
interests is especially severe.3"
A closely related point is that in order for the enactment cost strategy to
make sense, there must be a sufficiently close and positive relationship between
the interests to which the legislature actually responds and the interests that
can be legitimately balanced against constitutionally protected values. If, for
example, the legislature is more likely to ban a particular kind of expressive
conduct if that conduct tends to trigger violence, then raising the costs of
enacting a statutory ban on such speech is more effective in limiting
constitutionally problematic legislation to cases in which it is truly justified. If,
on the other hand, the legislature's interest in passing the speech-restrictive
statute is responsive only to normatively irrelevant or disreputable
considerations, rather than to legitimate government interests, then an
enactment cost strategy will be less effective. It may succeed in deterring some
unjustifiable violations of constitutional rights, but it will not be a useful
filtering or sorting mechanism.
Thus, one's assessment of the utility of the enactment cost strategy
depends considerably on one's view of the performance of American political
institutions. If one believes that these institutions, for all their faults, exhibit a
reasonable degree of positive responsiveness to normatively defensible policy
interests, then the enactment cost strategy is more sensible. The
correspondence need not be perfect, nor need it arise because of any intrinsic
benevolence on the part of policymakers. But, in order for the government's
willingness to incur private enactment costs to signal something useful about
the true public values at stake, the government's propensity to impinge on
constitutional interests must be stronger, on average, when the legitimate
government interests in doing so are more compelling. If one takes the more
pessimistic view that the outputs of American policymaking institutions are
generally unrelated to any normatively defensible concept of the public
interest, then an enactment cost strategy's viability is greatly diminished, and
perhaps eliminated.
2. Information
The second critical assumption of the theory concerns information: the
legislature must have better information about the actual impact of the policy
in question on relevant interests than does the reviewing court, but the court
35. Cf. Stephenson, Costly Signaling, supra note 3 (making this theoretical point in the analogous
context of judicial "hard look" review of administrative agency decisions).
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must have reasonably good information about legislative preferences. If the
government does not have superior information about policy effects, then there
is no asymmetric information problem to solve. If the court does not have at
least a rough sense of how government preferences and social preferences are
misaligned, the court cannot compensate for this misalignment by adjusting
legislative enactment costs.
Like the assumption that legislative interests are positively responsive to
public interests, the assumption that legislatures or other government
decisionmakers have better access to policy-relevant information implicates
one's views about the overall performance of American political institutions.
The more optimistic view is that, although the assumption of perfect
information made in the stylized examples presented above is an obvious
exaggeration, legislatures do typically make decisions on the basis of
information that is not available to a layperson or a reviewing court. Legislators
need not acquire this information directly, or even consciously process it.
Responsiveness to information may instead take the form of input from staff,
constituents, or interest groups. Nonetheless, in the optimistic view, legislative
action is likely to reflect, at least on average, a more informed judgment about
the connection between policy choices and actual outcomes. 6
The more cynical view is that government policymakers either do not know
or do not care about the connection between policy and outcomes.37 The
assertion that they do not care is a claim about incentives, related to the earlier
discussion concerning legislative responsiveness to public interests. The claim
that they do not know reflects a belief that the issues are sufficiently complex,
and the institutional means for information processing sufficiently poor, that
policy decisions reflect sheer guesswork.
The accuracy of these contrasting visions depends in part on the nature of
the policy issue, in part on the specific decisionmaker in question, and in part
on additional issues beyond the scope of this Article. The important point is
that a judicial strategy that focuses on manipulating legislative enactment costs
is most likely to be effective when the legislature plausibly has better
information about the connection between policy and outcomes than does the
court. If the legislature's information is not likely to be much better than the
court's, then the court may be better off doing the constitutional balancing
directly (either retail or wholesale).
36. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 19, at 209-10; Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members
of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707, 722-25 (1985); Adrian Vermeule, Common Law
Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1482, 1507-11 (2007).
37. See Devins, supra note 19, at 1182-86.
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Of course, even if the legislature initially has better information than the
court, the court may not need to use something like the enactment cost
strategy. Perhaps the court can learn what the legislature knows through more
direct means, such as demanding disclosure of relevant evidence. 8 The
problem with this strategy is that the courts may lack the necessary time or
expertise to assess the evidence proffered by the government. Furthermore, if
the legislature's decision is informed in the sense that it is responsive to the
information of a diverse array of constituents and interest groups, there may be
nothing tangible to disclose. Courts might also do their own research or rely on
information from third parties, but again the institutional limitations of courts
may preclude complete elimination of the informational asymmetry. The
court's ability to reduce its informational disadvantage is likely to vary across
different situations. The greater the court's ability to acquire relevant
information directly, the less necessary or desirable the manipulation of
legislative enactment costs will be as a means of extracting credible
information. Such a strategy is most useful in cases in which the judiciary finds
it impossible or excessively costly to acquire credible information from the
legislature through more direct means.
Despite the judiciary's disadvantages with respect to information about the
connection between policies and outcomes, the court must have reasonably
accurate information about legislative preferences in order for manipulation of
enactment costs to be a viable strategy.39 The court's information need not be
perfect, but the more uncertain the court is about legislative preferences, the
greater the error costs that doctrinal manipulation of enactment costs will
entail. To make this abstract point more concrete, consider again the
hypothetical Internet regulation statute. In order for an enactment cost strategy
to be viable, the court's judgment as to whether the legislature typically
overvalues national security or copyright protection relative to constitutional
liberty must be better than the court's judgment of the statute's actual impact
on the national security or intellectual property interests at stake.
This assumption will clearly not hold in all cases, but there are reasons to
suppose it will often be plausible. First, because political or ideological
considerations are likely to affect a large number of decisions, the court may
have a larger number of data points from which to infer legislative preferences.
Second, courts may be able to draw inferences about legislative preferences by
38. See Stephenson, supra note 28.
39. For similar reasons, the court also must have some sense of how different doctrinal
requirements will affect legislative and social opportunity costs. Without such information,
the court will not be able to determine what additional enactment cost, if any, would
improve screening in a desirable way.
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observing structural features of the political system. For example, it may be
reasonable to assume that legislative preferences will typically be biased in
favor of politically powerful groups such as those with highly concentrated
interests,40 or in the direction of addressing highly visible or salient public
concerns. 41 Electoral pressures may also distort legislative efforts in the
direction of short-term results or easily observable benefits.
4
3. The Social Costs ofEnactment Costs
The third critical assumption is that the court must be able to fashion
doctrines that increase the private opportunity costs to policymakers more than
the attendant social opportunity costs. As the earlier discussion noted, if
legislators devote more time and energy to passing one piece of legislation,
they have less time to devote to other tasks, such as work on other legislation,
oversight activities, campaigning, constituency service, and leisure. 43 Diversion
of resources away from these activities is personally costly to legislators, which
is why enactment costs can function as a screening device. But this resource
diversion may be socially costly if the other activities that compete for
legislative time and attention also serve the public interest. Thus, the valuable
screening function that enactment costs may perform is not free. Although
raising the legislature's enactment costs improves screening- making it less
likely that the legislature will enact a statute that would fail an ideal balancing
test -it also means that any statutes that are enacted will entail a higher social
cost than they would have otherwise. 4
Raising the legislature's enactment costs is only a desirable strategy if the
additional private opportunity costs for the enacting coalition are sufficiently
high relative to the additional social opportunity costs. Otherwise, the expected
benefits of improved screening will be offset by the expected social costs of
making legislative action more difficult. Furthermore, as long as at least some
40. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); MANCUR OLSON, THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).
41. See Hugo Hopenhayn & Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of
Regulatory Agencies, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 196 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115
HARv. L. REV. 1119 (2002) (book review).
42. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror, 61 INT'L
ORG. 9 (2007); Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests,
92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809 (1998).
43. See supra text accompanying note 22.
44. Of course, the social cost may be offset if the costly activities the court demands have
additional public benefits that are not internalized by the legislature.
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of the legislature's private enactment costs represent social opportunity costs,
the court will not want to increase enactment costs to the point at which the
legislature would never pass a statute with negative social value. Instead, the
court will tolerate some degree of incentive misalignment to avoid excessive
expenditure of scarce legislative resources on any one statute.
All this indicates that an enactment cost strategy is less desirable when the
other activities competing for legislators' attention are more socially valuable. If
one believes that more work on securing passage of the hypothetical Internet
regulation bill would come primarily at the expense of retail constituency
service work or leisure time for legislative staff, then raising the enactment
costs of the Internet bill may entail relatively low social opportunity costs. On
the other hand, if devoting more effort to passing the Internet bill would divert
resources from overseeing the implementation of existing statutes or securing
passage of other valuable legislation, then raising enactment costs may impose
significant social costs. 45 A judicial strategy that involves some increase in
enactment costs may still result in better expected outcomes than the court
would achieve if it attempted to balance constitutional values against
government interests directly, but the difference in relative desirability would
be smaller.
There may appear to be some tension between the assumption that the
legislature is positively responsive to legitimate public interests and the
assumption that the social opportunity costs of legislative enactment efforts are
relatively small. The former assumption seems to rest on an optimistic view of
the legislative process, while the latter assumption appears to rest on a more
pessimistic view that legislators devote much of their time and energy to
activities with low social utility. The tension dissolves, however, if one makes
the plausible assumption that although the legislative interest in any specific
project is positively correlated (in expectation) with the social value of that
project, the legislator's prioritization of various activities does not correspond
to a socially optimal prioritization. This is analogous to stating that a firm
manager's incentive to pursue a project is positively correlated with the
profitability of that project for the firm, but also that the manager's allocation
of effort across projects diverges from the allocation that would maximize the
firm's profitability.
45. Cf. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew C. Stephenson, Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect
Oversight, lOl AM. POL. Sci. REv. 605 (2007) (differentiating situations in which greater
effort devoted to a given policy is socially costly from situations in which it is not).
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4. Implementability
The fourth critical assumption of the enactment cost theory is that courts
are able to devise and implement doctrines that raise legislative enactment costs
in meaningful and predictable ways. In general, courts cannot mandate
additional enactment costs directly-they cannot, for example, impose a direct
tax on legislators for allocating resources to particular bills. Instead, the main
weapon available to the court is its power to strike down a law or policy. By
conditioning judicial approval of a challenged law on whether the legislature
has engaged in some set of costly activities, a reviewing court can raise
legislative enactment costs. For this approach to work, however, two
conditions must hold.
First, legislators must care about whether the statute is upheld by the court.
There may be cases in which this condition fails. Legislators sometimes vote
for statutes without knowing or caring whether those statutes will survive
constitutional scrutiny; the symbolic political benefit of taking a position on
some salient public issue may be all that matters. 46 Furthermore, legislators
may sometimes vote for a statute knowing, or even hoping, that the court will
reject or limit it. That way, the legislators can take credit for a popular but ill-
advised statute without having to deal with the undesirable consequences of
actually passing that statute into law.
47
These caveats notwithstanding, it seems implausible to suppose that
legislators are systematically indifferent to the fate of the statutes they pass.
After all, excessive indifference to legal viability can be a risky political strategy.
Sophisticated interest groups may well be aware of the doctrinal prerequisites
for constitutional validity. They will not be satisfied by empty symbolism, and
they will lobby for enactment of policies that will actually go into effect.
Furthermore, the unsophisticated mass public may only care whether, at the
end of the day, the problem the statute was meant to address was solved.
Average voters may be difficult to appease through symbolic position-taking
46. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61-73 (1974).
47. See Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do
We Have an Independent judiciary?, 13 INT'L REy. L. & ECON. 349, 361-64 (1993). A related
argument is that legislators often prefer that the courts resolve controversial issues so that
the legislators do not have to address these issues. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Keith E.
Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial
Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 583 (2005).
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precisely because they are unsophisticated and uninformed. 48 Having a statute
struck down as unconstitutional may also reflect badly on the legislature, and it
may embolden those legislators or constituencies that opposed the legislation
in the first place. Finally, to the extent that legislators care about advancing a
policy agenda, they will have an interest in enacting statutes that actually
become law. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that there is a sizeable set of cases
for which conditioning judicial approval on legislative enactment costs is likely
to have an effect on actual government behavior.
The second condition is that the court must be able to establish, within the
constraints of existing institutional arrangements, doctrines that actually raise
the government's enactment costs. That is, the reviewing court must be able to
impose conditions that the legislature must meet in order for a statute in a
given class to be upheld, and these conditions must be credible, meaningful,
foreseeable, and consistent with other features of American judicial and
legislative institutions. This last condition is important here because the point
of this Article is not to consider what sort of institutional arrangements might
be possible if one were building a political-judicial system from scratch, but
whether the existing federal judiciary has available doctrinal resources that are,
or can be, used to better achieve an appropriate constitutional balance by
raising legislative enactment costs. This issue is sufficiently important that I
treat it separately in Part II.
II. THE PRACTICE OF ENACTMENT COST MANIPULATION
Part I argued that when four key assumptions hold, courts can improve the
constitutional performance of government policymaking institutions by
conditioning judicial approval of certain constitutionally problematic policies
on the government's willingness to undertake activities that raise the costs of
enacting those policies. Doing so screens out government actions with benefits
that are low relative to their constitutional and other social costs, while
allowing the government to take action with relatively high social benefits.
That, at least, is the theory. Does anything like this occur in practice? After
all, courts typically do not speak in these terms, nor do most constitutional
scholars. One of the challenges and intended contributions of this Article is to
show that something like the enactment cost strategy is in fact much more
48. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial
Independence, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 379, 393-94 (2004); Matthew C. Stephenson, "When the
Devil Turns ... ": The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD.
59, 62-63 (2003).
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widespread in constitutional law than is generally acknowledged. As I will try
to establish, the prevailing doctrinal approaches in many areas of constitutional
law condition judicial approval on the willingness of legislators, or other
government decisionmakers, to incur some substantial cost, over and above the
"ordinary" cost of enacting a given policy. In some cases, it may be that these
doctrines emerge, persist, and evolve largely because of their effect on
enactment costs, even if they are not typically explained or defended in those
terms. Furthermore, even if the effect of these doctrines on legislative
enactment costs is entirely unintentional, the enactment cost theory might
provide a normative justification for at least some of these doctrinal strategies,
independent of their conventionally recognized effects. Focusing on the
enactment cost justification for various doctrines may, in turn, suggest ways in
which these doctrines ought to be refined or reformed.
This Part discusses four mechanisms through which constitutional doctrine
might raise legislative enactment costs. First, constitutional doctrine might
demand a direct government expenditure of material resources in order to
eliminate a constitutional deficiency. Second, constitutional doctrine might
impose onerous statutory drafting conditions, such as narrow tailoring or clear
statement requirements. Third, constitutional doctrine might reward or
penalize various forms of legislative history, making judicial approval easier
when the desirable forms of legislative history are present and the undesirable
forms are absent. Fourth, courts might devise constitutional doctrines that are
unpredictable in their application, which from an ex ante perspective may have
the same effect as an increase in enactment costs.
A. Expenditure of Material Resources
The natural place to begin is with those doctrines that expressly demand
that the government expend material resources to eliminate or remedy a
constitutional defect. Most obviously, some constitutional rules require the
government to pay money to injured parties. Similarly, judicial doctrines that
impose additional procedural requirements - either directly under the Due
Process Clause or indirectly through doctrines that reward procedural
formality with greater judicial deference- may require greater outlays from the
public treasury. These effects will raise legislative enactment costs to the extent
that the decisive coalition internalizes some of the costs associated with greater
expenditures of public funds.
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1. Constitutional Liability Rules
Some constitutional rules raise the material resource cost to government of
constitutionally problematic activities by requiring the government to pay
compensation to injured parties. Of these, the most well known is the
requirement that the government pay "just compensation" when it takes
property for public use pursuant to the eminent domain power.49 There are
arguably other constitutional liability rules as well, and some scholars have
argued for broader use of liability rules, as opposed to "constitutional property
rules," in other domains of constitutional law."° Constitutional liability rules,
like other liability rules, are often defended as serving both an interest in
compensation and an interest in deterrence.5' In addition, constitutional
liability rules, particularly the Just Compensation Clause, are sometimes
defended on fairness grounds that go beyond the traditional interest in
compensation. According to this argument, fairness requires that benefits to
the general public be paid for by the general public rather than by a small
number of disproportionately affected property owners.5 2
The compensation and fairness rationales for constitutional liability rules
have no direct relationship to the enactment cost theory elaborated in Part I,
but the deterrence rationale is a straightforward application of that theory. The
familiar argument runs as follows: If the government does not have to pay
compensation when it seizes private property, it will take property even when
the benefit of the taking, as perceived by the government, is less than the
benefit to the existing owners of retaining their property (as reflected in market
prices). If, however, the government must pay just compensation, the
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
So. See Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions,
56 STAN. L. REv. 755 (2004) (hereinafter Kontorovich, Liability Rules]; Thomas W. Merrill,
The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco
Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1143, 1157-65 (1999); cf. Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitution
in Two Dimensions: A Transaction Cost Analysis of Constitutional Remedies, 91 VA. L. REv. 1135
(2005) (arguing that constitutional liability rules are already more prevalent than is
generally appreciated).
51. On the deterrence rationale, see RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 84-85
(1993); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58-59 (7th ed. 2007); and William
A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic
Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269-70 (1988). On the
compensation rationale, see Kontorovich, Liability Rules, supra note 5o, at 759-60, 774.
52. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (196o) (stating that the purpose of the
Takings Clause is to prevent the government "from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole").
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government will take the property if and only if the monetized benefit of the
taking to the government is greater than the market price. Thus, the
compensation requirement allows socially efficient takings, in which the
monetized public benefit exceeds the market price, but deters socially
inefficient takings, in which the monetized public benefit is below the market
price. 3
An important feature of the deterrence argument-and an important way
in which it differs from the compensation and fairness rationales -is that the
court could achieve the optimal behavioral result through injunctive relief if the
court had accurate information about the social benefit of the proposed public
use. If the court had such information, it could simply prohibit takings with
negative net benefits and allow takings with positive net benefits, without
requiring that any compensation be paid in the latter case. Likewise, the
deterrence argument implicitly assumes that the government does not
internalize the full social costs of the taking to the property owner (or,
equivalently, that the government overvalues the benefits of the taking). If this
were not so, then the government would take the property if and only if the
true social benefit were greater than the true social cost, without any need for
judicial intervention.
The deterrence rationale for a just compensation rule is therefore sensible
only if we assume that the government is better informed than the court as to
the consequences of the taking but gives insufficient relative weight to the
interests of the property owners. Under these circumstances, a government left
to its own devices would take property too often, while a court attempting to
police takings through absolute injunctions would make frequent errors that
allow too many, or too few, takings to occur. A compensation requirement,
though imperfect, may induce better overall results because the increase in
enactment costs may offset the government's excessive zeal for takings.
The fact that the enactment cost in this context takes the form of a transfer
from the government to the injured party makes the strategy more attractive.
Conceivably, we could achieve the same deterrence result simply by making the
53. An obvious but important objection is the Coasean argument that an absolute property
rule -either that the government may take without compensation, or that the government
may not take without the permission of the property owner -would achieve the same result
when transaction costs are zero, because open-market bargaining will always cause the
property to be assigned to the party that places a higher value on it. See Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); RH. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (196o). The literature on this argument is too vast to summarize here. I assume, for
purposes of developing the argument, that there are many situations where transaction costs
or market failures preclude efficient Coasean bargaining.
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government destroy an amount of public money equal to the market value of
the seized property, but that approach would involve a pure deadweight social
loss. 4 The transfer payment to the property owner does not eliminate the
social cost of the taking because the compensation payment will require
additional tax revenue, borrowing, or the diversion of resources from other
government programs, but the deadweight loss component of the enactment
cost will be proportionally smaller."5
A general problem with viewing this sort of monetary liability rule as an
effective enactment cost strategy is that it assumes the government internalizes
the costs associated with expenditures from the public treasury. Several
scholars have observed, however, that governments do not act like profit-
maximizing firms. s6 Neither elected politicians nor bureaucrats are directly
rewarded for how effectively they manage public revenues, especially when the
government's capacity to run large budget deficits permits the legislature to
operate under a relatively soft budget constraint.17 Furthermore, the amounts
of money involved in compensating property owners are small relative to the
government's overall budget, and the burdens of supplying the needed funds
can be concentrated on politically weak groups either by raising their tax
burden or by diverting funds from programs that would otherwise benefit
those groups."s
These objections, while important, should not be overstated. While the
federal government, as well as the governments of some states and large cities,
may not be all that concerned about the amounts of public money that
contemplated takings would require, many local governments are more
financially constrained. 9 Moreover, unlike the federal government, many
states and localities are subject to balanced-budget requirements that give
sitting legislatures and executives less freedom to shift costs to future years
54. This is a characteristic feature, and a recognized weakness, of this form of "money burning"
signaling argument. See Stephenson, Costly Signaling, supra note 3, at 785-87.
5s. Of course, it might be even more socially efficient if the government were compelled to pay
the market value of the property not to the former owners, but rather to starving children
(or some other socially worthy cause).
56. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 345-48, 354-57 (2000); Louis Kaplow, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv. 509, 567-70 (1986); Edward Rubin,
Commentary, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REv. 1433, 1439-42 (1991).
57. See Levinson, supra note 56, at 354-57.
58. See id. at 375-77.
59. See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the
Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624 (20o6).
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(though state and local governments have found ways to circumvent some of
these limits). 6° And while government officials are not profit maximizers, they
may well want to maximize some combination of political support and the
achievement of specific policy objectives- and government money can be used
to buy both of those things. 6' A rational politician faced with the need to use
some government money to compensate for a taking of property would try to
raise this money in whatever manner is least disruptive of her political and
policy goals, but the fact that she will rationally try to minimize the
opportunity costs associated with a taking of property does not mean that
those opportunity costs are zero.
Thus, the claim that monetary liability cannot function as an effective
deterrent to inefficient takings-or, in the language I employ here, that
monetary liability is not a meaningful enactment cost-seems overstated. That
said, the amount of money that a legislature would need to pay to achieve "just
compensation" often may not result in significant increases in legislative
enactment costs because the legislature does not internalize the full social cost
of the compensation payment, just as the legislature does not internalize the
full social cost of the taking itself. Perhaps larger monetary liability would
achieve the desired deterrence result, which raises the intriguing (though
perhaps unrealistic) possibility that the government should be required to pay
the former owner compensation well in excess of the property's market value.62
The fact that compensatory monetary liability may not achieve optimal
deterrence further suggests the need to look at other ways that courts might
raise the enactment costs of constitutionally problematic policy decisions,
particularly those that involve costs that are more fully internalized by the
enacting coalition.
6o. See D. Roderick Kiewiet & Kristin Szakaly, Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An
Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62 (1996).
61. See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 22, at 8, 29-31, 58-59; JOHN A. FEREJOHN, PORK
BARREL POLITICS 49-51 (1974); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 48 QJ. ECON. 371 (1983); Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C.
Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 8o AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 89 (1986); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84
AM. ECON. REv. 833 (1994); see also Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay:
The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REv. 845 (2001) (responding to
Daryl Levinson's critique of the deterrence rationale for making the government pay
compensation).
62. The downside of this, however, is that the social cost of a larger transfer is likely to be
greater.
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2. Procedural Safeguards
Requiring a direct payment to injured parties is not the only -way that
courts can raise the material cost of constitutionally problematic government
enactments. Other doctrinal rules and principles may also raise the resource
costs of certain policy decisions. For example, courts might invoke the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to require the
government to provide (costly) procedural safeguards before the government
may interfere with certain constitutionally significant interests. Supreme Court
case law on procedural due process has elaborated the sorts of procedural
protections that are required for different forms of deprivation of liberty or
property.6 s Other constitutional provisions provide for more specific
procedural protections for particular types of government action, such as the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and the Fifth Amendment's grand
jury indictment requirement.
In addition to those constitutional rules that directly require some type of
procedural formality, other constitutional doctrines indirectly encourage-or,
in some cases, practically require -the government to use elaborate procedures
in order to secure judicial approval for an otherwise constitutionally doubtful
decision. In the takings context, for instance, the Fifth Amendment requires
the government to establish that the taking is for a "public use." This
requirement is particularly salient when the government transfers property
between private parties. 4 Whether the government used elaborate formal
procedures in making the decision to take the property would not seem to bear
any necessary relationship to the question of whether the taking serves a public
use, yet Public Use Clause opinions sometimes emphasize this consideration.6 s
Similarly, in the nonconstitutional administrative law context, whether an
agency used formal decision-making procedures in promulgating an
63. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990); Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532 (1985); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
64. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986 (1984); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954).
65. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 (emphasizing the "comprehensive character of the [city's
development] plan" and the "thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption"); id. at 493
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the city's compliance "with elaborate procedural
requirements" as a reason not to apply a stricter standard of review to the city's taking and
transfer of private property).
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interpretation of a statute is a central factor courts consider in deciding whether
the agency's interpretation is entitled to deference.66
The conventional justification for constitutionally or judicially imposed
procedural requirements is that they increase accuracy by correcting mistakes
ex post and by encouraging government decisionmakers to be more thoughtful
and careful ex ante. I do not dispute this benefit of procedural formality,
though there is room for disagreement about how effective the sorts of
procedures mandated by courts actually are in improving substantive accuracy.
I want to suggest that in addition to whatever direct accuracy-improving or
error-correction effects formal procedures may have, additional procedures also
raise the material costs of certain government actions, whether that action is
conducting a search, taking private property, terminating welfare benefits, or
what have you. If the relevant government decisionmaker internalizes a
significant portion of these resource costs, then judicial imposition of formal
procedural requirements will increase enactment costs, with the potential
screening results described in Part 1.67
This separate effect is easier to see if we assume, counterfactually, that
procedural formality has no direct effect on accuracy. If we make that
assumption, then the only function that these procedures have (aside from
whatever psychological or legitimacy benefits they may confer) is to increase
the material cost to the government of taking the action that requires the use of
procedures. This procedural cost may function as an enactment cost, deterring
the government from taking action when the perceived net benefit to the
government of the action is low, but enabling the government to take action
when the perceived net benefit of the action to the government is high.
Again, my argument is not that this is the only effect of procedural
formality. If it were, then some other costly activity, including burning money
or buying food for starving children, would be just as effective at protecting
constitutional values as requiring formal procedures (except insofar as
procedural formality has some intrinsic constitutional value). The argument is
that in addition to whatever benefits formal procedures have with respect to
improving accuracy, they may also have the screening benefits associated with
increasing enactment costs. The strength of this latter benefit is proportional to
the degree to which the relevant government decisionmaker internalizes the
costs associated with the additional formal procedures.
66. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001); see also Stephenson, Strategic
Substitution, supra note 3, at 534 n.14 (advancing a rationalist explanation for why procedural
formality affects judicial deference to agency legal interpretations).
67. See Masur, supra note 3; Stephenson, Strategic Substitution, supra note 3.
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This perspective on procedural requirements has at least two interesting
implications. First, it implies that the marginal benefit of any given procedural
safeguard may be higher than it would appear if only error-correction benefits
were considered. To put the point in a slightly different way, the enactment
cost perspective suggests that the marginal cost of additional procedures may
be less than it might otherwise appear: While some of the additional
procedural cost is indeed a social cost, some of that cost has a partially
offsetting social benefit insofar as it more closely aligns government
preferences with social preferences. Second, because of the screening effect, the
set of cases that are actually subjected to the required formal procedures is
likely to consist disproportionately of cases in which the government interest in
taking the action is relatively strong. These observations together suggest that
one might underestimate the net benefits of judicially imposed procedures if
one neglects the enactment cost effect and looks only at cases in which the
government decided to take the action that triggers the additional procedural
safeguards.
That said, the concerns about the efficacy of direct monetary compensation
apply to the use of costly procedures as well. If the responsible government
decisionmakers do not internalize a substantial portion of the procedural costs,
or if the procedural costs themselves are insignificant relative to the other costs
and benefits at stake, then the effect of judicially imposed procedural formality
on enactment costs may be trivial. This suggests that the marginal benefits of
such procedural requirements are likely to be higher when they require the
primary government decisionmaker to internalize significant costs than when
they do not. It also suggests the importance of looking beyond material
resource expenditures to other types of judicially imposed requirements that
more directly raise enactment costs by imposing burdens directly on the
government actors involved in promulgating constitutionally problematic
policy decisions.
B. Statutory Drafting
Another way that courts can raise the enactment costs of constitutionally
questionable policies is to impose drafting requirements that make
promulgation of such policies more time-consuming and difficult. I will focus
on two closely related drafting requirements that may have this effect. The first
is the requirement that a statute be narrowly tailored to achieve some
legitimate purpose. The second is the requirement that, in order to achieve
certain constitutionally problematic results, the legislature must provide a clear
statement of its intent. Narrow tailoring requirements and clear statement
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rules have many effects, but one effect common to both is an increase in the
costs associated with drafting a statute to achieve a disfavored result.
i. Narrow Tailoring
Numerous constitutional doctrines, most notably in the areas of free
speech, due process, and equal protection, demand that statutes be "narrowly
tailored. ''68 The obvious and intuitive purpose of a narrow tailoring
requirement is to reduce the problem of overinclusiveness, along with the
attendant risk that an overbroad statute will be applied in an undesirable
discriminatory fashion.6 9 Put another way, a narrow tailoring requirement may
be a way to ensure that statutory restrictions are only applied in those cases in
which the social benefits of these restrictions are high relative to the
constitutional costs. Even if the aggregate benefits of a broadly worded statute
would outweigh the aggregate costs, a court might still want to improve the
cost-benefit ratio by eliminating, to the extent possible, those individual
applications for which the costs exceed the benefits.
This does not completely explain why a court would strike down an entire
statute on the grounds that it failed the narrow tailoring requirement. Even if
the courts dispensed with the narrow tailoring requirement, they could accept
case-by-case challenges to particular applications of the statute. This alternative
approach has several drawbacks, however. Reliance on as-applied challenges
may create substantial uncertainty for both regulators and potentially regulated
parties, and it may also entail significant litigation costs for litigants and courts.
It may therefore be more sensible for the court to insist that the legislature do
the narrowing of the statute ex ante, rather than relying on the judiciary to
address the overinclusiveness problem ex post. Doing so may lessen the
68. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 846 (1997); Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769
(1982); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1975); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 6ol, 611-12 (1973); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
15o-51 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965); Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43
UCLAL. REV. 1781 (1996); Coenen, supra note 2, at 1823-28; Fallon, supra note 34.
69. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992); Ayres, supra note 68,
at 1786; Coenen, supra note 2, at 1728; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible
Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417 (1996).
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aggregate social costs of reducing statutory overinclusiveness, and it will also
shift those costs from courts and litigants to the enacting legislature.
7°
This last point about shifting the costs of tailoring the statute to the
legislature suggests that a narrow tailoring requirement may also be a way for
courts to raise legislative enactment costs, independent of the effect of the
narrow tailoring requirement on how broadly the statute will actually apply.
We can see this by considering a hypothetical case in which the narrow
tailoring requirement has no effect on the scope of a statute's application in
practice. Suppose that the legislature is considering a statute that prohibits
publication of "information which would tend to undermine national security."
On its face, the statute appears to sweep very broadly. Suppose, however, that
we make the (unrealistic) assumption that in practice law enforcement officials
would only apply the statute to some subset of the conduct that might
conceivably violate the statute's broad terms. Call this subset X. Alternatively,
we might define X as the subset of applications that the court, applying the
relevant doctrinal tests for as-applied constitutional challenges, would permit.
Although the broadly worded statute appears to prohibit a large set of
activities, its actual effect is to prohibit only conduct in subset X.
Now imagine that the Supreme Court imposes a narrow tailoring
requirement that says the statute is unconstitutional unless the statutory
language itself restricts application to subset X. By assumption, compliance
with this narrow tailoring requirement would not narrow the actual application
of the statute, because the conduct that the statute prohibits in practice is only
subset X, with or without narrow tailoring of the statute itself. But the
enactment cost to the legislature is higher under the narrow tailoring
requirement, because the legislature has to try to determine the subset X ahead
of time, draft sufficiently detailed statutory language to define that set, and
bear whatever opportunity and political costs are associated with engaging in
that additional drafting activity.
The analysis in Part I suggests a reason why the court might want to
impose a narrow tailoring requirement in such a case, even though the scope of
the statute's practical application would not be affected. The court might worry
that, although prohibiting conduct in subset X might be justified by a
sufficiently compelling interest, the legislature undervalues the constitutional
concerns at stake relative to the competing government interests. But, the court
might be aware that the legislature has better information about the actual
70. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992)
(discussing the salient differences between resolving questions about a law's application ex
ante and ex post).
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effect of prohibiting the conduct in subset X. Even though the narrow tailoring
requirement does not alter the scope of the statute's application in practice, it
means the legislature will not bother enacting a narrowly tailored statute unless
the benefits are sufficiently large. If the assumptions developed in Part I hold,
then this narrow tailoring approach may be a sensible strategy for the
reviewing court.7"
To be clear, my claim is not that narrow tailoring requirements do not alter
the breadth of a statute's application if it is enacted. The preceding example
made that assumption in order to clarify a separate and independent effect that
a narrow tailoring requirement may have on legislative enactment costs. Seeing
narrow tailoring doctrines in this light reveals their importance not only in
cabining the scope of constitutionally problematic enactments, but also in
ensuring that such statutes are justified by sufficiently weighty government
interests. This suggests an additional reason why a court might prefer to
impose a narrow tailoring requirement, rather than limiting statutory
overinclusiveness through ex post judicial limitations on the scope of the
statute's permissible applications.
2. Interpretive Presumptions and Clear Statement Rules
In addition to narrow tailoring mandates, courts can impose other
requirements on the statutory drafting process that raise the enactment costs of
constitutionally problematic policies. One common doctrinal technique with
this effect is the so-called clear statement rule. 72 When a court invokes a clear
statement rule, it announces that it will not ascribe to statutory language a
certain disfavored meaning unless the legislature has made that meaning
p-. This argument is similar to, but distinct from, the claim that narrow tailoring requirements
ensure "some measure of care and deliberation in the lawmaking process itself." Coenen,
supra note 2, at 1728; see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12 (suggesting this justification for the
narrow tailoring requirement in the First Amendment context). The argument developed in
this Article is not that narrow tailoring rules produce more careful and appropriate policy
choices by forcing legislative reflection and deliberation, though that may well be one effect.
Instead, the argument advanced here is that by raising the costs to legislators, narrow
tailoring rules may implement a screening mechanism independent of any other effects on
legislative reflection or consideration.
72. For general discussions of clear statement rules and related canons of statutory
interpretation, see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES (2008); Coenen, supra note
2, at 1603-40; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992); and Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405, 451-6o (1989).
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unmistakably clear in the text of the statute.73 There are quite a few clear
statement rules, many of which are explicitly designed to enforce constitutional
values. Most obviously, under the modern version of the canon of
constitutional avoidance, courts will construe statutes so that they do not raise
difficult constitutional problems. That is, if Congress wishes to come close to
the constitutional line, it must make its intention to do so clear.74 There are
also a variety of more specific clear statement rules that seem designed to
protect constitutional values through statutory interpretation. These include
the presumptions against federal derogation of traditional state functions7 or
abridgement of state sovereign immunity,76 and the narrow construction given
to conditions on federal grants,77 which are all designed to protect federalism
values; the rule of lenity' 8 and the presumption in favor of judicial review,
79
which protect due process values; the tendency to construe statutes in ways
that favor groups that are especially vulnerable to government discrimination,
73. It is important to emphasize that when a court refuses to adopt a particular reading of a
statute because Congress has not endorsed that reading with sufficient clarity, the court is
rejecting the reading that its other tools of interpretation would otherwise indicate is the
best understanding of the text. Otherwise, the clear statement rule has no effect on the
outcome.
74. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 44o U.S. 490
(1979); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in
Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1O7, 1028-34 (1989) (discussing the judicial use of
clear statement rules to protect constitutional values); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1003 (1994) (same).
IS. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431
(2005); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947).
76. See Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys.
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204 (1991); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985);
Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo. v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare
of Mo., 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
77. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
78. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (198o); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
79. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476
U.S. 667 (1986); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The
Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND.
L. REv. 743 (1992).
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which advances the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause;8 °  the
presumptions against extraterritorial legislation 8' and against congressional
derogation of the President's foreign affairs power,82 which safeguard
presidential primacy in international relations; the presumption against
retroactive deprivations of vested rights, which protects the property and
liberty interests guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment as well as the interests
safeguarded by the Contracts Clause; 8' and the judicial reluctance, at least in
some instances, to read congressional delegations to executive branch agencies
broadly, which may be a way of indirectly limiting congressional abdication of
its Article I lawmaking responsibilities. 84
Courts and sympathetic commentators typically justify the use of
substantive, quasi-constitutional clear statement rules with one or more of four
arguments. The first is the empirical claim that legislators are reluctant to
intrude on the sensitive topics protected by the various clear statement rules.
Thus, if the statute suggests but does not clearly require a meaning that would
implicate the clear statement rule, it is probably the case that the members of
the enacting legislative coalition did not intend or understand the statute to
have that result. This is especially true if the provision at issue attracted little
attention, debate, or opposition.
8
,
The second argument in favor of clear statement rules is that they foster
deliberation and careful consideration on constitutionally sensitive topics.
Sophisticated legislators or interest groups will not be able to sneak something
so. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973);
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 72, at 602, 610-14; Sunstein, supra note 72, at 473, 484.
Si. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
82. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
83. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358 (1999); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244
(1994); Winfree v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 227 U.S. 296, 301 (1913).
84. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Indus. Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (198o); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation
Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 223; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).
85. See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (plurality opinion);
Rust v. Sullivan, Soo U.S. 173, 191 (1991); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 466 (1989); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 18l, 2o6 n.50 (1985); Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,
300 (1944); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 79 (1994); Eskridge, supra note 74, at
1020-22.
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by a majority of the enacting coalition, nor will the legislature itself be able to
sneak something by the voters. The demand for a clear statement, on this view,
compels a greater level of transparency, deliberation, and accountability than
would attend the ordinary legislative process.86
The third argument in favor of constitutionally derived clear statement
rules appeals to a kind of judicial minimalism.87 Because clear statement rules,
particularly the canon of constitutional avoidance, obviate the need to resolve a
hard constitutional question by deciding the case on statutory grounds, these
rules are thought to foster judicial modesty and moderation, as well as to
preserve the courts' institutional legitimacy and authority and to limit conflict
with the other branches of government.88
The fourth standard argument in favor of quasi-constitutional clear
statement rules is more explicitly substantive, and perhaps for that reason it is
less commonly articulated in judicial decisions. The argument goes something
like this: The judiciary is charged with implementing duly enacted statutory
law, but it is also charged with enforcing constitutional values. Courts have
some authority to enforce constitutional values indirectly, by construing
ambiguous statutes in ways that advance those values. This is not inconsistent
with the judicial responsibility to enforce statutory law, because by definition
an ambiguous statute is susceptible of multiple interpretations.8 9 So, the
argument goes, if the legislature has failed to provide sufficiently clear
commands, the courts may and should interpret those ambiguous commands
so as to advance other substantive values that are derived from the
Constitution. 9°
86. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 139; United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); Greene v.
McElroy, 36o U.S. 474, 507 (1959); Calabresi, supra note 2, at 1O4; Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 72, at 631; Sunstein, supra note 72, at 471; Young, supra note 3, at 16o8.
87. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999) (arguing in favor of minimalist approaches to judicial interpretation).
88. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998); Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
8g. See Young, supra note 3, at 1588-93.
go. See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 34-35 (1957); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy:
The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 1o8 HARv. L. REv. 593, 652
n.3o8 (1995); Sunstein, supra note 72, at 459; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2112 (199o); Young, supra note 3. This justification for
using something like the constitutional avoidance canon to enforce constitutional values is
more prominent in countries that lack a written constitution. See T.R.S. Allan, Legislative
Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 111
(1985) (England); Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2ool Term-Foreword: A Judge on
Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REV. 16 (2002) (Israel).
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Critics of substantive clear statement rules have attacked all of these
justifications on a variety of grounds.9 This Article does not aspire to address
or resolve these debates. Instead, it suggests that judicial demands for a clear
congressional statement, in addition to whatever other effects they may have,
can serve to increase legislative enactment costs for constitutionally
problematic policies. This argument is similar to the last of the four
justifications for constitutional clear statement rules sketched above. It differs,
however, by emphasizing that the clear statement rule is a method for gauging
indirectly the strength of the constitutional value relative to the other public
interests at stake. 92 This argument thus avoids the potential criticism of the
more standard constitutional values position that such an approach would lead
to overprotection of certain constitutional values at the expense of other
legitimate public interests. The point of the avoidance canon and related clear
statement rules, on this account, is not simply to enforce a constitutional value,
but to assess the relative strength of competing government interests.
This argument parallels the earlier argument as to how narrow tailoring
requirements can increase legislative enactment costs. Indeed, both narrow
tailoring requirements and clear statement rules are, at bottom, judicial
demands for greater precision in statutory drafting. Judicially devised clear
statement rules and judicially imposed narrow tailoring requirements both
require the enacting legislators and supportive interest groups to make a
statute clearer if they want to achieve constitutionally problematic results.
Producing this additional clarity raises the enactment costs for the coalition
that supports the statute.
93
91. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 8oo (1983); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 71.
92. Cf EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 262 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Clear-statement rules operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than to shield
important values from an insufficiently strong legislative intent to displace them."); Young,
supra note 3, at 1552 (characterizing the constitutional avoidance canon as a "resistance
norm" of constitutional law that "may be more or less yielding to governmental action,
depending on the strength of the government's interest, the degree of institutional support
for the challenged action, or the clarity of purpose that the legislature has expressed").
93. See Brudney, supra note 85, at 30 ("[A]dding these details to text [to satisfy a judicial clear
statement rule] increases the possibility for delay and obstruction even though the details
themselves would command overwhelming support .... because each provision, clause, or
word of a statute can become the focus of additional amendments or procedurally based
attacks from a small but sufficiently determined minority."); Rodriguez, supra note 79, at
747 ("[T]he presumption of reviewability ensures that legislators must expend greater than
normal costs to rebut this presumption...."); Young, supra note 3, at 1597, 16o8-o9 ("The
effect of the presumption [in favor of judicial review] is that supporters of administrative
nonreviewability in Congress must expend the time, effort, and political capital necessary
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As before, it is easier to see this effect if we assume that a clear statement
rule neither reflects an accurate empirical judgment about legislators'
preferences nor improves the quality of legislative deliberation. To illustrate,
let us again suppose that the legislature is considering the hypothetical Internet
regulation statute. The enacting coalition and its supporters understand that
the version of the statute originally proposed would authorize government
monitoring of Internet activity in ways that would raise constitutional
questions related to speech and privacy. The statute is sufficiently ambiguous,
however, that a court could plausibly read the statute not to allow this sort of
intrusive electronic snooping, even though that is not the best reading of the
statutory text.
Let us now consider three doctrinal regimes that the court might apply: one
in which the court treats the electronic monitoring in question as
constitutionally permissible, one in which the court treats it as prohibited, and
one in which the court would hold that this sort of monitoring is permissible if
the court were forced to address the question, but the court would avoid the
constitutional question through statutory interpretation if possible. Let us also
assume that the legislature can anticipate which approach the court will adopt.
Under the first regime, the legislature would pass the original version of
the statute and the court would uphold the electronic searches as
constitutional. Under the second regime, the legislature would either amend
the statute to remove the offending provision or allow the court to invalidate it.
Under the third regime, in which the court applies a clear statement rule, the
legislature's choice is more complicated. The legislature could simply pass the
statute as originally drafted, even though it knows that the court will adopt a
strained interpretation that does not allow the problematic searches.
Alternatively, the legislature could amend the statute to make explicit its
authorization of electronic snooping. This latter approach would allow the
intrusive electronic searches to go forward, but it would entail additional costs
for the enacting coalition.
There are a few reasons why compliance with a clear statement rule might
entail significant additional enactment costs. First, even if legislators and
interest groups are generally aware that reviewing courts will apply the
constitutional avoidance canon or some other clear statement rule, these
interested parties need to figure out exactly how to draft the statutory language
to secure judicial approval. This takes work, and this work has opportunity
costs: the legislative aide or interest group staffer who is working on crafting
language that will satisfy the clear statement rule is not doing other things.
squarely to confront the jurisdictional issue and formulate the needed clear statement of
congressional intent.").
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Second, the need to get additional language into the bill provides one more
opportunity for members of the enacting coalition to extract a price for their
support and one more opportunity for opponents to obstruct or delay passage.
Third, supporters of the constitutionally problematic provisions of the statute
have only so much time and political capital. If they have to invest these
resources in fashioning a sufficiently clear statement to satisfy the courts, they
may have less ability to advance other aspects of their agenda. This is especially
so if the clarity of the statement itself raises the profile, and hence the political
salience, of the constitutionally problematic provisions.
If clearer statutory drafting is more expensive to members of the enacting
legislative coalition and their supporters, then clear statement rules may raise
enactment costs. Legislators and interest groups will be willing to bear these
additional costs only if the statutory benefits internalized by the members of
the enacting coalition are sufficiently high. If the four assumptions described in
Part I hold, then the constitutional avoidance canon and other clear statement
rules may help reviewing courts implement indirectly a regime that more
closely approximates an ideal constitutional balancing test. Even if the
interpretive canons applied by the court do not reflect an accurate empirical
evaluation of legislative preferences, do not facilitate more deliberation, and do
not appreciably reduce judicial activism, these canons may function as a
screening device that helps to ensure that the legislature will not pursue
constitutionally problematic policies unless the enacting coalition views those
policies as sufficiently important.
C. Legislative History
Few issues in the theory and practice of statutory interpretation are as
contentious as the debate over the proper role of legislative history. Any
attempt to summarize this debate will oversimplify the more nuanced and
sophisticated arguments for and against judicial use of legislative history in
resolving statutory ambiguities.94 With that caveat, most of the contemporary
94. For a small sampling of the vast literature on this topic, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without
Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
1 (1999); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 845 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994); John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673 (1997); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
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discussion revolves around three questions. The first is the degree to which
different types of legislative history are reliable evidence of some normatively
legitimate conception of statutory meaning.9" The second question concerns
the broader institutional effects that judicial use of legislative history may have
on both the legislative process and the judicial process. 96 The third question is
whether judicial use of legislative history may be illegitimate for reasons
independent of its probative value or practical consequences.
97
Again, these debates are sufficiently complex that this Article cannot and
does not aspire to engage them directly, nor does it take a final position on
when, if ever, courts should employ various forms of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. I make the more modest claim that viewing
constitutional doctrine through the lens of enactment cost manipulation
suggests ways that courts might use legislative history in order to implement
indirectly an appropriate constitutional balancing test. If judicial willingness to
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(Amy Gutman ed., 1997); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of
Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1457 (2000); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the
Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371; Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the
Limits ofJudicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833
(1998); and Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
277 (1990).
95. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 620 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REv. 886, 888
(1930); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 3, 24. There is, in turn, an even
more longstanding and complex debate over theories of statutory meaning. The three
leading theories (really, categories of theories) are (i) intentionalism, which views the search
for statutory meaning as a search for the intent of the enacting legislators; (2) purposivism,
which seeks to identify a statutory purpose or set of purposes that may be different from or
independent of the intention of any individual legislator; and (3) textualism, which posits
that questions of statutory meaning turn on what the words of the statute would have been
understood to mean by an objective reader of the statute familiar with the context in which
it was enacted. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 94. Although criticism of the probative value of
legislative history is often associated with textualism, while sympathy to the use of
legislative history is usually associated with intentionalist or purposivist approaches, there is
no necessary theoretical connection between these positions. It would be possible, for
example, for a textualist to view legislative history as highly probative of how a reasonable
person would have understood statutory language at the time it was enacted, while an
intentionalist or purposivist might view certain forms of legislative history as highly
unreliable guides to relevant forms of intention or purpose.
96. See Breyer, supra note 94, at 859; Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation,
34 TULSA L.J. 679, 685 (1999); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need To Bring
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 407-10 (1992).
97. See Manning, supra note 94.
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look to legislative materials beyond the text of the challenged enactment can
raise the costs to the legislature of adopting constitutionally problematic
policies, this can filter out government decisions that have low benefits relative
to their constitutional costs. This argument differs from most of the
conventional arguments for the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation, and it may therefore avoid some, though certainly not all, of the
traditional criticisms.
Judicial attention to legislative history can influence legislative enactment
costs in at least two ways. First, certain types of legislative history may be
costly to produce: extended hearings, elaborate studies, reports, and the like. If
reviewing courts evince greater skepticism of enactments that are not
accompanied by elaborate supplementary materials of this kind, the courts may
effectively raise legislative enactment costs. Second, while potential members
of an enacting coalition may view some forms of legislative history as costly,
they may view other forms as politically beneficial. For instance, politicians
might trumpet the harm that a given enactment will inflict on an unpopular
minority group in order to appeal to the prejudices of a majority. If reviewing
courts demonstrate a greater willingness to invalidate enactments accompanied
by "bad" legislative history, they may effectively raise the costs of such
enactments because supporters will not be able to advertise, and may even have
to disclaim, objectives that would be politically popular.
1. Rewarding "Good" Legislative History: Analysis and Explanation
Requirements
When a reviewing court evaluates the legality of a government decision
challenged on constitutional or other grounds, the court may consider whether
the responsible government decisionmaker has developed an adequate
explanation of the basis for its decision, often in the form of a record or report
containing detailed evidence and analysis. The reviewing court may be more
inclined to uphold a challenged action accompanied by such material, and in
extreme cases the courts might treat development of a sufficiently detailed
record as a prerequisite to the legal validity of the policy itself.
These sorts of explanation requirements are the norm in judicial review of
administrative agency decisions. 98 Although this approach is rarer and more
98. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983);
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Stephen Breyer,
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 383 (1986); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and
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controversial in judicial review of legislative decisionmaking, there are
numerous examples of cases in which the Supreme Court appears to have
conditioned its approval of a constitutionally problematic legislative enactment
on the quality of the legislative record. 99 A particularly good illustration is the
Court's approach to assessing the constitutionality of prophylactic legislation
enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 grants
to Congress "the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation" the substantive
provisions of the Amendment, including prohibitions on state deprivations of
equal protection or due process.100 The question of when Congress can invoke
this power, particularly in the context of federal statutes that purport to
abrogate state sovereign immunity from civil lawsuits, has proven difficult.
The Supreme Court has held that the validity of a congressional invocation of
Section 5 depends on the "congruence and proportionality" between the risk of
constitutional violations and the legislative means adopted to prevent such
violations.1"' Although the Court has repeatedly denied that the quality of the
legislative record is a significant consideration in evaluating whether federal
legislation satisfies the congruence and proportionality test,"02 in practice the
the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DuKE L.J. 387, 411-13, 419-25;
Stephenson, Costly Signaling, supra note 3, at 758-61.
99. For scholarly discussions of this phenomenon, see A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J.
Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional
Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2OOl); William W. Buzbee & Robert A.
Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87 (2001); Coenen, supra note 2, at
1655-89; Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 8o (2001);
Devins, supra note i9; Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings,
Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695 (1996);
Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, ill YALE L.J. 1707 (2002); Harold J. Krent,
Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 731 (1996); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 226-
32 (1976); and Stephenson, Costly Signaling, supra note 3, at 794-800.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 5.
iol. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
10a. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646
(1999) (stating that "lack of support in the legislative record is not determinative" of
whether Congress has exceeded its Section 5 powers); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (stating
that "lack of support in the legislative record" is not dispositive and that judicial deference to
congressional judgments is "based not on the state of the legislative record Congress
compiles"); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (noting that Congress is not
required to "make particularized findings in order to legislate").
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Court often points to the quantity and quality of evidence in the legislative
record (or lack thereof) in making these determinations." 3
Something like this approach also appears in some First Amendment
speech cases, in which the Court has required Congress to present an adequate
record showing the legitimacy of the purported government interest in
imposing a speech restriction. In these cases, the question is typically whether
the government's interest in the challenged speech restriction is sufficiently
weighty in light of the applicable level of scrutiny. In deciding that question,
the Court often looks to the evidence in the legislative record compiled by
Congress in support of the legislation. 1°4 As in the Section 5 cases, the Court
disclaims any intent to treat Congress like an administrative agency by
subjecting its record of decision to a kind of "hard look" review."' 5 But, as in
the Section 5 cases, the Court often seems to do precisely that.
The focus on the quality of the legislative record shows up in equal
protection jurisprudence as well, particularly in the affirmative action cases.1°6
Justice Powell, who wrote the controlling opinion in the seminal case Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, °7 appears to have viewed the adequacy of
legislative findings as particularly important. Justice Powell emphasized that
although a race-conscious admissions program at a public university might be
constitutional in the presence of adequate findings that such a program was
necessary to advance a compelling state interest in remedying past racial
discrimination, the California Board of Regents had not made such findings
with respect to the admissions policy challenged in Bakke. ' Furthermore, in
103. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 528-29 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 730-32 (2003); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-69,
371 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88-89, 91 (2000); Fla. Prepaid, 527
U.S. at 640, 644, 646.
104. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 530-31 & n.17 (2OOl); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 391-92 (2000); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822
(2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), 520 U.S. 18o, 196-213 (1997); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 n.41, 879 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512
U.S. 622, 664-68 (1994); id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Sable Commc'ns of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128-30 (1989); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 60-62 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665-66.
1o6. See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1670-75.
107. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
io8. Id. at 305 ("In this case ... there has been no determination by the legislature or a
responsible administrative agency that the University engaged in a discriminatory practice
requiring remedial efforts.").
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his concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, °9 which upheld an affirmative
action program for federal public works projects, Justice Powell emphasized
the importance of formal congressional findings and legislative history that
established the program was necessary to remedy past discrimination. ' More
recent affirmative action decisions suggest that other members of the Court
also view legislative findings as significant, though the opinions are somewhat
opaque on this point.'
There are also examples of cases in which the Court might have adopted a
doctrinal approach that emphasized the quality and comprehensiveness of the
legislative record, but decided not to do so. The best illustrations are the
Commerce Clause cases United States v. Lopez 12 and United States v. Morrison.'13
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Lopez indicated that adequate
congressional findings were necessary to deciding that a federal law
criminalizing possession of firearms near schools was a valid exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.114 The opinion suggested the
possibility that adequate congressional findings might lead the court to find no
constitutional violation."s In affirming the Fifth Circuit's holding, the Supreme
Court also emphasized the absence of congressional findings of a substantial
effect on interstate commerce." 6 The Court, however, stressed that it would
io9. 448 U.S. 448 (198o).
io. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 549-50, 552 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that congressional findings were inadequate to justify the program).
mii. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492, 500, 504, 510 (1989); id. at 520 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 & n.16 (1982); Coenen, supra note 2, at 1673-75.
112. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
113. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
114. 2 F.3d 1342, 1362-64 (5th Cir. 1993). As support for this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit cited
several Supreme Court cases in which, according to the Fifth Circuit, statutes had been
"upheld against Commerce Clause attacks on the basis of formal Congressional findings
.... [or] legislative history." Id. at 1362 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231-232 &
n.3 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277-79 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 n.1
(1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298-300, 303-04 (1964)).
115. 2 F.3d at 1363, 1368 (noting that when congressional findings of a substantial effect on
interstate commerce are present, "[piractically speaking, such findings almost always end
the matter," but declining to reach the question whether the legislation at issue might be
sustained if accompanied by "adequate Congressional findings or legislative history").
116. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562; see Coenen, supra note 2, at 1659-61; Robert F. Nagel, The Future of
Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 643, 652 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation,
Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1179, 1194 n.73 (1996).
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exercise its independent judgment in deciding whether a federal law had
substantial effects on interstate commerce, and that congressional findings
were only useful insofar as they aided the Court in making that judgment.
117
The Court drove this point home in Morrison. In that case, Congress
provided extensive hearing records and documentation in support of the
assertion that the Violence Against Women Act's civil cause of action for
gender-based violence would have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce." 8 The Supreme Court, however, dismissed these findings as
irrelevant to the Commerce Clause analysis and reemphasized that the Court
was to make an independent judgment regarding a statute's effects on
interstate commerce." 9 After the Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez and
Morrison, it is not clear whether congressional findings have any significant
effect on the probability that a purported congressional exercise of the
Commerce Clause power will be upheld. 2 But it is plain that the Supreme
Court could have adopted, and may yet adopt, an approach more similar to the
one that the Fifth Circuit adopted in Lopez, and that Justice Souter appeared to
endorse in his Morrison dissent.
Judicially imposed evidence and analysis requirements are typically
explained and justified with reference to two interrelated purposes. First, the
government's decision-making record may provide the reviewing court with
more substantive information about the strength of the government's interest,
which the court can use to make its own independent assessment of whether
the policy ought to be upheld. In other words, explanation requirements may
be a way of mandating information transmission from the government to the
court.' Second, explanation requirements may assure the court that the
government actually has made a decision on the basis of some degree of
information and expertise. Even if the reviewing court cannot confidently
117. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
118. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614; id. at 628-36 & nn.2-9 (Souter, J., dissenting).
i1i. Id. at 614-15 (majority opinion); Coenen, supra note 2, at 1661-62.
120. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 20-22 (2005); id. at 53-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Coenen, supra note 2, at 1661-65 & n.373.
121. This appears to be how the Supreme Court majority opinions in Lopez and Morrison view
the relevance of congressional findings. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15 (stating that "the
existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality
of Commerce Clause legislation" and rejecting congressional findings that rely on an
"unworkable" method of reasoning); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (suggesting that
congressional findings, though not required, may be useful in Commerce Clause cases when
such findings "would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye").
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assess the government's explanation on the merits, it may be able to use the
quality of that explanation to distinguish informed decisionmaking from
uninformed decisionmaking. A more cynical alternative to these two
explanations is that reviewing courts actually care little about the quality of the
legislative record, and judicial statements (positive or negative) about the
quality of the record are usually no more than makeweights.'22
I do not deny any of these possibilities. What I want to suggest is that, in
addition to whatever other functions may be served by judicial attention to the
quality and quantity of the legislative record, this approach may also raise
legislative enactment costs. Holding hearings, commissioning and presenting
studies, providing evidence and explanation, instructing staffers to prepare
elaborate analyses, and related activities all consume time and resources that
could have been devoted to other things.'23 The greater the quantity and
quality of the supporting materials, the more time and resources will typically
be required. Thus, the more significance a reviewing court attaches to the
legislative record for a given decision, the greater the enactment costs of that
decision are likely to be. This is true whether the requisite work is done by the
legislators and their staffs or by outside interest groups, as they all face
significant opportunity costs for this use of their time and resources.
If this is true, and if the other conditions for the enactment cost argument
hold, then implicit or explicit judicial demands for a high-quality legislative
record may help implement constitutional values, independent of any other
function these requirements might perform. To put the point as starkly as
possible, even if courts learn no verifiable information from the content of a
legislative record, the mere fact that the enacting legislative coalition produced
that record can provide the court with useful information about the strength of
the government's interest. Again, I am not claiming that legislative record
requirements perform no function other than increasing enactment costs, nor
do I claim that influencing enactment costs is the conscious purpose of those
courts that emphasize the quality of the legislative record. What I do argue is
that when courts condition approval of constitutionally problematic legislation
on the presence of costly legislative history, this has the effect of raising the
government's enactment costs, and this in turn may perform the screening
function described in Part I. The positive and normative debates over these
sorts of doctrinal approaches are therefore incomplete if the effect on
enactment costs is neglected.
122. See Coenen, supra note 2, at 1688-89, 1845-47; Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional
Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. RI v. 1871, 1871-76 (2001).
123. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV.
873, 919 n.256 (1987).
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2. Penalizing "Bad" Legislative History: Impermissible Statements of
Government Motive
The preceding examples involved cases in which the reviewing court
rewarded legislators for providing "good" (but costly) explanations for
constitutionally problematic decisions. There are also cases in which the courts
appear to punish legislators for advancing "bad" explanations -that is,
providing "bad" legislative history-for their policy choices. In addition to
whatever other effects that judicial punishment of such explanations might
have, this approach increases the government's enactment costs insofar as the
judicially disfavored statements in the legislative history are politically
beneficial to the relevant government decisionmakers.
Judicial attention to disfavored explanations for government policy choices
is particularly notable in the context of the First Amendment's religion clauses.
A persistent difficulty in enforcing both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause, at least on their prevailing modern understandings, is
the problem of distinguishing impermissible religious favoritism or hostility
from permissible recognition of, or permissible interference with, religious
beliefs or practices. When does recognition become favoritism? How do we
know when the government has crossed the line separating legitimate policies
that happen to burden certain religious practices from illegitimate policies that
suppress or penalize particular religious beliefs ?":
One approach that courts have used, when trying to draw these
distinctions, is to look not only at the challenged government enactment, but
also at what its supporters have to say about it. In numerous Establishment
Clause cases, reviewing courts have looked beyond the challenged enactment
itself to the rhetoric of the responsible government officials. Rhetoric in the
legislative history (before or after enactment) suggesting hostility to religious
minorities, or a desire to privilege particular religions or religion generally, may
render the enactment more vulnerable to constitutional invalidation on
Establishment Clause grounds. 25 This approach also crops up in other
124. See JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1995); Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General
Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1113 (1988); Noah Feldman, From
Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REv. 673
(2002).
125. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); id. at 881, 883-84 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); id. at 597 (Powell, J., concurring);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, S6-6o (1985); id. at 65 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 74-79
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constitutional contexts-most notably the First Amendment's Free Speech
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as well as
other areas.126
Judicial attention to legislative history that evinces a desire to support or
suppress religious practice, or some other disfavored purpose, is
controversial. '27 Several possible justifications for such attention are prominent
in the literature and the case law. First, and most obviously, if one purpose of
the First Amendment's religion clauses is smoking out bad government
motives, legislative statements may be highly probative. A closely related
argument turns on the claim that the primary harms the religion clauses are
designed to prevent are symbolic or psychological: the feeling of exclusion or
marginalization, along with the social divisiveness that may arise as a
consequence of such feelings.,2 8  If so, then government rhetoric is
constitutionally relevant because such rhetoric directly affects the social
meaning and understanding of legislative acts. 9 Even if legislative rhetoric
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment):, Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 253-55 (1982);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961). Some Justices also appear to ascribe
significance to the rhetoric of enacting legislators in determining whether the government
has violated the Free Exercise Clause by targeting specific religious beliefs or practices for
disfavored treatment. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 5o8
U.S. 520, 540-42 (1993) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion).
126. E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000); id. at 768-69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-32
(1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-3S (1973); see Paul Brest, The
Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 589-94
(1975); Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95; Coenen, supra note 2, at 1755-72; John Hart Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970);
Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 843; Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 413 (1996).
127. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968);
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 466, 468-69 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); cf Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REy. 533, 547 (1983) (arguing against the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation generally).
128. A similar claim might be made regarding at least one of the purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause.
12g. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); B. Jessie Hill,
Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104
MICH. L. REv. 491 (2005).
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does not independently influence the social meaning of government acts, it
may be probative as to how such acts are understood in the relevant
community.
The enactment cost perspective developed in Part I does not directly engage
the validity of these claims. Instead, it suggests a possible alternative or
additional function that judicial penalization of "bad legislative history" may
perform. One reason government decisionmakers often advertise the religious
motivations behind a particular legislative or administrative act is because it is
politically advantageous to do so. In many communities, legislators have an
incentive to demonstrate their piety not only through rhetoric, and not only
through government action, but through the conjunction of the two. The value
of religiously inspired legislation is greatly reduced, however, if the enacting
legislators are not allowed to invoke their support of that legislation as
evidence of their religious convictions without jeopardizing the validity of the
enactment itself. Forcing the legislators to abstain from pro- or anti-religious
rhetoric when promulgating a constitutionally problematic decision may
perform a screening function similar to that associated with doctrines that
impose additional costly requirements. Here, instead of adding an enactment
cost, the courts subtract an enactment benefit, which amounts to the same
thing.
To illustrate, imagine that a state legislature is considering a bill that would
prohibit businesses from opening on Sundays.13° The law will produce some
benefits, both religious and secular. A Sunday closing law may provide a sense
of religious solidarity for the Christian community, and it may encourage
prayer and reflection. Designating one day a week as a mandatory holiday
might also have a variety of non-religious benefits, and picking the day that
most residents would customarily want to take off anyway is a sensible thing to
do. On the other hand, a Sunday closing law will also produce costs. Some of
these costs implicate the values and interests that the Establishment Clause, on
some plausible accounts, is designed to safeguard. By affirming the significance
of the Christian Sabbath and facilitating Christian religious worship, the
Sunday closing law may place disproportionate burdens (both material and
psychological) on non-Christians, which in turn could increase divisiveness
along religious lines.'
31
130. See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. 420.
131. As was the case with the Equal Protection Clause example, see supra text accompanying
notes 30-31, this Article ascribes a set of purposes to the Establishment Clause in order to
develop the example, but the Article does not take a position on whether this is in fact the
best understanding of the Clause.
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A rational state legislator, acting in good faith, will try to balance these
considerations. This legislator will also recognize that the political benefits
from supporting the Sunday closing law are greater if she can claim, openly
and adamantly, that she supported the law primarily out of a desire to honor
and promote Christian religious beliefs. For purposes of developing the
argument, let us take off the table the argument that by engaging in such
rhetoric the legislator would alter the social meaning of the law so that it would
have a more marginalizing and divisive effect. Let us further assume that there
is nothing inherently objectionable about a desire to promote Christian
solidarity and to encourage Sunday prayer, as long as other religious or secular
groups do not suffer any significant harm. This assumption is obviously
contestable, but I want to put to one side the argument that judicial attention
to legislative rhetoric is appropriate because religious motivations are
inherently illegitimate.
The legislator will support the Sunday closing law if the benefits, political
and otherwise, exceed the costs. Suppose, however, that the legislator
undervalues the costs associated with the marginalization of non-Christian
citizens and the religious divisiveness that a Sunday closing law may foster.
Again, I am assuming a legislator who is not hostile to these interests - she just
does not care about them enough to strike the constitutional balance
appropriately if left to her own devices. Finally, suppose that the reviewing
court is not terribly good at evaluating the actual impact of the Sunday closing
law. On this predictive question, the legislature is likely to have better
information than the court.
This is simply another manifestation of the scenario developed in Part I. As
the discussion in that Part demonstrated, the reviewing court might improve
outcomes by raising the cost to the legislator of enacting the new law relative to
retaining the status quo. One way for the court to do this is to make clear that
it will uphold the Sunday closing law if but only if the enacting legislators
abstain from making statements to the effect that they support the legislation
because it recognizes and promotes Christian religious practices. The court
might go further, requiring members of the enacting coalition expressly to
disclaim any religious purpose for the law. Such a doctrinal approach would
reduce the benefits legislators could expect to realize from passing the
legislation. Those benefits, including the benefits associated with promoting
observance of the Christian Sabbath, would not disappear, but the political
benefits to enacting legislators would decrease because these legislators would
not be able to point to their support of this legislation as evidence of their
piety. By reducing legislators' ability to claim credit for certain popular aspects
of the Sunday closing legislation, the legislation's political benefits will fall
relative to its costs. This effect can bring the legislators' preferences more
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closely into line with the reviewing court's view of the appropriate
constitutional balance."13
One appealing feature of this form of enactment cost strategy is that it may
entail fewer deadweight costs than other approaches. Compelling a legislature
to devote scarce resources to preparing elaborate records may divert resources
from other socially valuable activities. Telling legislators that they must abstain
from certain kinds of rhetoric may have considerably fewer social costs. I do
not want to push this point too far, however. If we maintain our assumption
that there is nothing inherently wrong with facilitating Christian worship, then
there may be a social cost associated with preventing legislators from taking
full credit for certain aspects of their policy decisions. More generally,
encouraging politicians to be disingenuous may be socially costly, both by
encouraging cynicism and by giving political leaders an incentive to expend
resources in order to make sure their true motives and interests are
communicated to relevant constituency groups in some other way.
The enactment cost argument for penalizing bad legislative history is not
mutually exclusive with other justifications for this approach, such as the belief
that statements by government officials shape the social meaning of
government policy. But the enactment cost argument is independent of these
other arguments. One might believe that the only constitutionally relevant
consideration is the effect of the law, not the intent of the legislators, yet still
132. Although I have categorized enactment cost strategies that emphasize legislative history into
those that reward "good" legislative history and those that punish "bad" legislative history,
it would also be possible to classify these approaches in terms of whether they focus on the
resource cost of the legislative history (where the enactment cost derives from the diversion
of resources to producing the legislative history materials) or on the content of the
legislative history (where the enactment cost derives from the political cost of foregoing, or
including, certain types of substantive statements in the legislative history). In other words,
what I have called "good" legislative history might be better characterized as "resource-
intensive" legislative history, while what I have called "bad" legislative history might be
better characterized as "politically advantageous position-taking." I use the "good" and
"bad" classifications because these seem to track the judicial treatment of the different types
of materials -resource-intensive explanations are perceived and characterized as good and
useful efforts to establish the need for a particular enactment, while particular forms of
politically advantageous position-taking, such as those discussed in the text, are viewed as
evidence of bad motives. But this need not always be the case: if a court upholds legislation
only if the legislative history contains an affirmative statement, such as the explicit
disavowal of a religious motive for a Sunday closing law, then this might better be
categorized as "rewarding good legislative history," even though the focus is on content
rather than resource cost. And, of course, the resource cost and content effects may
sometimes both be present, and may cut in opposite directions, as when a lengthy and
detailed analysis of the justifications for a controversial enactment also contains politically
expedient rationalizations.
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reach the conclusion that penalizing bad legislative history is an appropriate
instrumental strategy for ensuring that those laws that are enacted are more
likely to satisfy an ideal constitutional balancing test.
D. Doctrinal Uncertainty
Few judges or commentators have many kind words for unpredictability in
constitutional doctrine.133 Indeed, the social costs of unpredictability are well
known. When it is difficult to anticipate how a constitutional test will apply in
different circumstances, the result may be underdeterrence (if parties have an
incentive to push constitutional limits and courts are reluctant to sanction
government conduct ex post)13 4 or overdeterrence (the "chilling effect" that can
arise if parties are concerned about incurring serious penalties if their behavior
is ruled unconstitutional). 3s Unpredictability may also increase litigation costs,
and some fear that insufficiently clear and determinate doctrine will allow-
indeed, encourage -judges to make constitutional rulings according to their
subjective preferences regarding outcomes in individual cases. , 6 While there
are many defenders of unpredictable legal standards, they do not typically
defend unpredictability as such. Rather, they extol the virtues of flexible,
context-sensitive doctrinal tests, and insist that the benefits of clear, predictable
133. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 537
(1993); Eric A. Posner &Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 991,
1022 (2008); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1700-02; cf. Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the
Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 126-33 (1992) (discussing the costs of legal ambiguity in the context
of statutory interpretation). But see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE
L.J. 1029, 1042 (2004); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO L. REv. 93, 100-03 (2002); Mike Schaps, Vagueness as a Virtue: Why the Supreme
Court Decided the Ten Commandments Cases Inexactly Right, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1244-45,
1265-68 (2006).
134. See Marin R. Scordato & Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech Rationales
After September iith: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America, 13 STAN. L. &
POL'Y R.Ev. 185, 188 (2002).
135. See Auvil v. CBS 6o Minutes, 67 F.3 d 816, 822 (9 th Cir. 1995); Michael A. Lawrence, Toward
a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. ,&
PUB. POL'Y 395, 398-99 (1998); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1701 & n.29; Case
Comment, Kelo v. City of New London, 119 HARV. L. REv. 287, 293 (2005); Julian Cyril
Zebot, Note, Awakening a Sleeping Dog: An Examination of the Confusion in Ascertaining
Purposeful Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1o63, 1o66 (2002).
136. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 12.
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constitutional doctrines come at too steep a price.137 Many would therefore
view Mark Tushnet's conclusion that "clarity is a virtue that cannot be valued
too much in constitutional law" 38 as only a slight exaggeration.
Despite this, many areas of constitutional law are rife with uncertainty.
Consider, as one of a number of possible illustrations, dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, especially with respect to state laws that do not overtly or
intentionally discriminate against out-of-state entities. While state laws that
facially discriminate against out-of-state entities are presumed to be
unconstitutional unless the state interest is compelling,139 even a statute that
does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce may run afoul of the
dormant Commerce Clause if "the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 4° This may sound
straightforward, but in practice the application of dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine is confusing and unpredictable. 14' The result of this uncertainty, many
argue, is that states are deterred from engaging in a variety of regulatory
activities.
142
Another example of an area of constitutional law plagued by uncertainty
concerns the use of race as a factor in drawing legislative districts. In Shaw v.
Reno, 43 the Supreme Court invalidated North Carolina's districting plan on the
grounds that the boundaries of a majority-African American district were so
bizarre that the plan impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race, in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Among the numerous criticisms
137. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 1o6 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992).
138. Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125, 150.
139. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
140. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
141. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 479 (1982);
Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENT.
395, 399 (1986); Lawrence, supra note 135, at 397-99 (1998); Tushnet, supra note 138, at 15o-
56.
142. See Farber, supra note 141, at 414 ("Because the outcomes of the [dormant Commerce
Clause] cases are so unpredictable, the doctrine may well have a chilling effect on legitimate
state regulation."); Lawrence, supra note 135, at 398 ("The lack of a coherent dormant-
commerce-clause doctrine leaves individual States with much uncertainty about how far
they may go in regulating activities that might implicate interstate commerce .... A State
that is uncertain about the limits of its authority in regulating activities that might affect
interstate commerce may be hesitant to enact novel and possibly visionary laws out of fear
that they will be struck down in court.").
143. 5o9 U.S. 630 (1993).
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directed at the Shaw opinion was the argument that the Court's "I know it
when I see it" 44 approach was a recipe for confusion. Under this uncertain
standard, two critics wryly observed, "each decade will inaugurate a new
impressionistic course of litigation, presumably following the developmental
structure of the animal kingdom, over the proper shape of districts ....
[S]nakeline districts would clearly fail, but 'bug-splats' might stay on the
margin, and even amoeboid- or octopus-shaped districts may survive.'
'1 45
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have generally failed to add much clarity
or certainty to the doctrine.146
Many areas of constitutional doctrine are, of course, unclear at the moment
that the courts first start to engage with the relevant problems. Often the
doctrine becomes clearer over time, as a body of precedents accumulates and
the courts refine and clarify the nature of the tests they will apply.147 But, as the
dormant Commerce Clause, redistricting, and numerous other possible
examples illustrate, some doctrinal areas stubbornly resist this sort of
clarification. As noted above, the failure of courts to achieve greater doctrinal
clarity over time is usually viewed as imposing significant social costs.
Without minimizing the problems that doctrinal uncertainty can create,
this Article's analysis of enactment costs as a screening mechanism suggests a
potential benefit to this sort of unpredictability. The argument goes something
like this: the enactment of any legislation entails opportunity costs for the
members of the enacting coalition, who bear these costs regardless of whether
the legislation ultimately goes into effect. Enacting legislators may accrue some
benefits that are independent of whether a statute is upheld, but in most cases
a sizeable fraction of the political and ideological benefits of passing legislation
144. Id. at 646-47; see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity-'I know it when I see
it'- as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize
that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an
explanation.").
145. T. Alexander Aleinikoff& Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional
Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 624 (1993); see also Pamela S. Karlan &
Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1212-13 (1996) (discussing
the unpredictability of the Shaw standard).
146. See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26
CUMB. L. REV. 287, 287-89, 301-04 (1996); Karlan & Levinson, supra note 145, at 1213 &
n.64, 1215, 1226.
147. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial
Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755 (2002). Sometimes, however, doctrine can get less
predictable over time, or move in cyles between clarity and vagueness. See Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (making this point with
respect to property law).
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will be realized only if the legislative proposal becomes and remains valid law.
When any individual legislator decides whether she will invest effort in passing
a statute, she will compare the costs and benefits of enactment. The legislator
will discount the present value of these benefits, however, if she cannot be sure
whether the courts will uphold the statute. The less likely the courts are to
sustain the statute, the lower the net benefits to the legislator of passing it.
Therefore, as the probability of judicial acceptance drops, the higher the
anticipated benefits of the statute would have to be to justify enacting it.
Because of this, doctrinal unpredictability is another way that courts can
raise the legislature's enactment costs. In the enactment cost manipulation
strategies discussed in previous sections, judicial doctrine increased enactment
costs by conditioning approval of a constitutionally problematic policy on
whether the government engaged in some costly activity -spending money,
devoting time or political capital to more careful drafting or providing the right
kind of legislative history, and so forth. In contrast, doctrinal uncertainty
makes judicial approval probabilistic rather than conditional. But probabilistic
approval, like conditional approval, can lower the expected net benefits of
constitutionally problematic actions without precluding the possibility of such
actions altogether.
This is simply a restatement of the "chilling effect" criticism of doctrinal
unpredictability: uncertainty about whether a statute will be upheld reduces
the expected net benefits of passing the statute (relative to the net benefits in
the case in which the statute would certainly be upheld), but does not change
the costs of enactment. 148 Of course, doctrinal uncertainty increases the expected
benefits of enacting a statute when the comparison is to a world in which the
statute is certain to be struck down.'49 The important point is that, by varying
the probability with which a given statute will be upheld, the court can vary the
effective enactment costs associated with that statute. Doing so will have a
screening effect, because the legislature is more likely to invest the time and
effort in passing a statute of uncertain constitutionality if the benefit of the
statute to the enacting coalition is high.
To illustrate with a stylized example, imagine a state legislature considering
a statute that would incidentally burden interstate commerce. Imagine that the
enactment cost for this statute, to a representative legislator in the potential
enacting coalition, is 3 units of utility. Let us suppose further that there is a
20% ex ante probability that this statute will have a very large positive effect on
legitimate state interests; if so, the statute is worth io units of utility to the
148. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
149. See Lawrence, supra note 135, at 398-99.
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enacting legislature. There is also an 8o% probability, however, that the
benefits will turn out to be more modest, worth only 4 units of utility to the
legislature. Let us also assume that the legislature knows whether the statute
has high or moderate benefits before enacting it. Because the value of the
statute (4 or io) exceeds the enactment cost (3) even in the case in which the
statute has lower benefits, the legislator would always prefer enactment, absent
other considerations.
Now, consider the problem from the reviewing court's perspective. Assume
that the court views the legislature's interests as legitimate, but the court also
believes that the state legislature systematically undervalues the constitutional
interest in preserving an unfettered national market. Stipulate that the statute
in question would impinge on this constitutional interest, and the court views
this impingement as imposing a cost equal to 5 units of utility. Furthermore,
the state legislature does not internalize this utility loss. Thus, if the court
upholds the statute, it would receive 5 net units of utility (io minus 5) if the
statute has high benefits, while the court's payoff from upholding the statute
would be -1 (4 minus 5) if the benefits of the statute are more modest.
If the court knew the true benefits of the statute, it could condition its
ruling on that information. But the court may not be able to make that
assessment. If the uninformed court had to choose between upholding the
statute and striking it down, the court would uphold the statute. The reason is
that the expected value of the statute to the court is 0.2 units of utility: there is
a 20% chance that the statute is worth 5, and an 8o% chance that it is worth -1.
The 0.2 units of expected utility the court gets if it upholds the statute are
better than the zero expected utility the court gets if it strikes the statute down.
The state legislature, of course, will pass the statute regardless of whether the
benefits are high or low, given that it can anticipate a net utility payoff of i (4
minus 3) if the statute's benefits are low and 7 (io minus 3) if those benefits are
high.
Now suppose that the court can commit in advance to an "unpredictable"
legal doctrine. In particular, suppose that under this doctrine, there is a 5o%
chance that the statute in question would be upheld, but there is also a 50%
chance that the court would decide it violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
In this case, the legislator's expected utility from passing a statute with high
benefits is 2 units of utility: the legislator bears a cost of 3 up front, and has a
5o% chance of realizing a gain of io. So, if the statute has high value, the
legislator still views it as worth passing, even though there is a So% chance that
the court will strike it down. If the statute has more modest benefits, however,
the legislator would not be willing to pass the statute because the net utility
payoff of doing so is -1: passing the statute requires paying an enactment cost
of 3 in exchange for a 5o% chance of realizing a gain of 4.
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Because the only statutes that reach the court under these conditions are
those that have high benefits, the court would prefer ex post to uphold the
statute in all cases. By assumption, the court cannot do so because it has
committed itself to applying a doctrine that will invalidate the statute half the
time. 5 The court's commitment to this unpredictable legal doctrine gives it an
expected utility payoff of o.5: in the 8o% of cases in which the statute has only
moderate benefits, the court gets its status quo payoff of zero; in the lo% of
cases in which the statute has high benefits but the court strikes it down, the
court also receives a payoff of zero; in the io% of cases in which the statute has
high benefits and the court upholds it, the court realizes a net utility payoff of
5. Thus, the expected utility to the court when it commits to an unpredictable
doctrine (o.5) is greater than its expected utility payoff when it simply makes
its best (predictable) choice ex post (0.2).
The reason for this is that the uncertainty of judicial doctrine has a more
powerful deterrent effect on the legislature for low-value statutes than for
high-value statutes. Running the risk of judicial reversal is more worthwhile to
the legislature when the statute has a higher value. In the stylized example
discussed above, the court's best choice would be to commit to striking down
legislative enactments with a 25% probability. A 75% chance that a statute is
upheld is just small enough that the legislature would not enact a statute unless
it has high rather than low benefits. So, the court's expected utility would be
0.75 (the 20% probability of a high-value statute times the 75% probability the
statute is upheld times 5 net units of utility) -more than three times higher
than the 0.2 units of expected utility the court would realize if it followed the ex
post optimal strategy of upholding the statute loo% of the time.
The foregoing argument implies judicial behavior that appears perverse, at
least at first blush. The only cases the court hears are those in which the
statute's constitutional costs are outweighed by legitimate government
interests, yet the court strikes down a large number of them. Furthermore, the
court's decisions as to which statutes it will uphold and which it will strike
down seem totally haphazard-which, in fact, they are, at least in the stylized
version of the argument. An ex post evaluation might well conclude that the
court's behavior was inexplicable and unjustifiable. Such a conclusion,
however, might be too quick. If the court behaved differently -for example, if
it were willing to uphold all statutes in the relevant class -the mix of statutes
that the legislature would enact might change considerably. As the above
example illustrates, such a change could lead to results that are systematically
150. If this were not true, screening at the legislative stage would not occur. This underscores
how central the court's ex ante commitment to an unpredictable legal doctrine is to the
structure of this argument.
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worse for the court when considered in the aggregate. Thus, doctrinal
unpredictability, whatever its other costs, may be useful as a way to raise
legislative enactment costs relative to anticipated statutory benefits.
The above argument is subject to a number of important qualifications and
limitations. Foremost among these is the fact that the argument works only if
the court can credibly commit itself to a doctrinal framework that is
unpredictable at the point of application. Put another way, the court must be
able to commit itself to striking down some number of legislative enactments,
despite the fact that, ex post, the court would prefer that these enactments be
upheld. The credible commitment problem applies to most versions of the
enactment cost strategy, but the problem may be particularly acute in the
context of a commitment to strike down some proportion of legislative
enactments at random.
A second important qualification is that introducing uncertainty as to
whether the court will uphold a legislative enactment does not always improve
the court's expected utility, even when the four assumptions described in Part I
hold. For one thing, the court must correctly calibrate the degree of doctrinal
uncertainty. For another, even though doctrinal uncertainty improved the
court's utility in the stylized example developed above, it would be easy to
construct an example in which the court does just as well, or better, by always
upholding or always rejecting a given type of legislation. The desirability of the
strategy of doctrinal unpredictability depends on the probability distribution of
the possible statutory benefits. Speaking informally, some degree of doctrinal
unpredictability is likely to be desirable when there is a high probability that
the statute has low value for the legislature and negative value for the court,
but there is some probability that the statute has sufficiently high value that its
ex ante net expected value from the court's perspective is positive. In this set of
cases, the court can do better by rejecting statutes at random with some
positive probability, as this will deter the legislature from passing the statute
unless it is high-value.
Finally, the costs of unpredictable constitutional doctrine may often
outweigh any screening benefits that unpredictability may create."1' Just as the
deadweight social costs of judicial doctrines that increase enactment costs
directly may outweigh the benefits of such doctrines, this may also be the case
for doctrinal approaches that commit the court to some degree of
unpredictability. That said, understanding the potential benefits of
unpredictability as a screening device may provide a partial explanation for
why certain areas of judicial doctrine are more resistant to clarification and
151. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 133, at 1022.
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consistency than would otherwise seem optimal. The courts may recognize the
virtues of predictability and clarity, but they may also see virtues in keeping the
legislature a bit uncertain about which policies will pass constitutional muster,
especially when the best clear rule the court could come up with would allow
the legislature to promulgate large numbers of policies that the court, if fully
informed, would view as unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
This Article has advanced two central claims. First, Part I argued that under
certain conditions, reviewing courts may implement constitutional guarantees
more effectively by crafting doctrines that raise the costs to government
decisionmakers of enacting constitutionally problematic policies. When the
conditions described in Part I are satisfied, this enactment cost strategy has
distinct advantages over both case-by-case balancing approaches and absolute,
categorical rules that designate certain types of government action as
prohibited or permitted. Second, Part II attempted to show that, while few if
any judicial doctrines are explicitly and consciously designed with the primary
purpose of raising legislative enactment costs, many doctrines in fact have that
effect. Thus, the enactment cost approach to judicial regulation of
constitutionally problematic government activity may be more widespread
than it would at first appear, and certain doctrinal approaches may be justified
on enactment cost grounds even if these doctrines were not developed
explicitly with that purpose in mind. At the very least, federal courts already
have the doctrinal resources to implement such a strategy, if they choose to do
SO.
The fact that an enactment cost strategy may be effective under some
circumstances does not mean, however, that existing doctrines are well suited
to this function. Indeed, given that few if any existing doctrines were designed
with the express purpose of manipulating legislative enactment costs, it would
be quite surprising if it turned out that all these doctrines served this function
well. Part of the point of this Article is to suggest how consideration of the
screening functions served by judicial enactment cost manipulation may lead to
productive suggestions for doctrinal reform. Such considerations are obscured,
however, by adherence to the view that constitutional doctrine is only about
marking out the boundaries of permissible government action rather than
about creating incentives that protect constitutional values indirectly.
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